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INTRODUCTION
66 AWFARE" IS traditionally defined as "the use of law as a
weapon of war against a military adversary."' Lawfare in
the context of forum non conveniens is meant to be understood
on a spectrum. At one end, forum non conveniens as "lawfare"
describes largely benign and metaphorical activities by players;
at the other end, the term connotes ways in which forum non
conveniens cases are international law violations; between either
end is the evolution between the poles. First, lawfare describes
the way in which forum non conveniens is used as a procedural
tool to "defend" courts from being inundated with lawsuits, es-
pecially lawsuits brought by foreign plaintiffs for foreign aviation
accidents with little to no connection to the United States. Sec-
ond, it encompasses the often malicious acts taken by plaintiffs
to defeat a court's forum non conveniens dismissal. Finally, and
most egregiously, it describes the way in which Country A at-
tempts to subordinate Country B's laws to Country A's laws. While
it would not fit the traditional definitions of the term lawfare as
used by other scholars,2 it is appropriate to extend the defini-
I David Luban, Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 457, 457 (2010).
2 The term lawfare, in its most modern application, was first coined by Major
General Dunlap describing terrorists using the law as a weapon of warfare. Wou-
ter G. Werner, The Curious Career of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 61, 66
(2010). However, lawfare is a nuanced term with applications in a variety of con-
texts, such as Guantanamo detainees and habeas corpus petitions, universal juris-
diction, hate speech litigation, the Goldstone Report, and infringements on the
United States' ability to conduct military operations. Id.; see also Laurie R. Blank,
Finding Facts but Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza, and Lawfare, 43 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 279, 279 (2012); Brook Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, "Legal
fihad": How Islamist Lawfare Tactics Are Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSAJ. INT'L COMP.
L. 395, 397 (2009); David Luban, Lawfare and LegalEthics in Guantdnamo, 60 STAN.
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tion to situations in which the subordination of laws infringes on
Country B's sovereignty, which is a violation of customary inter-
national law. The term lawfare has extended to forum non con-
veniens litigation since the recent decision by France's Cour de
Cassation, which is, at best, an affront to international comity
and, at worst, a violation of U.S. sovereignty.'
This article will track the evolution of forum non conveniens
lawfare through a number of seminal cases from the last ten
years, namely Air France, Hosaka,5 West Caribbean,6 and the most
recent decision from France's highest court.' The article begins
by explaining the historical context and purposes of the Warsaw
and Montreal Conventions to introduce the international law
governing the forum non conveniens issues presented. Al-
though the Montreal Convention serves largely as an amend-
ment to the Warsaw Convention, countries that are signatories
only to the Warsaw Convention are not governed by the Mon-
treal Convention.' Thus, it is important- to understand both
Conventions. Next, this article will look at the ways courts use
forum non conveniens as a defense mechanism and how courts
have defined the doctrine in the international aviation context.
Then, this article will examine the ways that plaintiffs have tried
to defeat forum non conveniens. This article will next examine
L. REv. 1981, 2020-21 (2008); Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the
Crime of Aggression, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 381 (2012). The Lawfare Project was
launched in 2010 to highlight so-called lawfare attacks on the internet. See Spen-
cer Hart, Groundbreaking Lawfare Project Launched, ALGEMEINER.COM (Mar. 16,
2010), http://www.algemeiner.net/generic.asp?openYear=2010&id=6325&cat=.
The Project's mission statement is said to be " [r]aising awareness and facilitating
a response to the abuse of the law as a weapon of war." The Lawfare Project, THE
LAwFARE PROJECT, http://www.thelawfareproject.org/LPFlyer.pdf (last visited
Mar. 19, 2013). The website notes that modern-day lawfare has five goals: (1) "To
silence and punish free speech about issues of national security and public con-
cern"; (2) "To delegitimize the sovereignty of democratic states"; (3) "To frus-
trate and hinder the ability of democracies to fight against and defeat terrorism";
(4) "To confuse laws of armed conflict with human rights law"; and (5) "To pre-
vent the application of human rights law in situations where it is needed the
most." What Is Lawfare? Asymmetric Warfare by Abusing Laws, THE LAWFARE PROJECT,
http://thelawfareproject.org/what-is-lawfare.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
3 See infra Parts IV & V.
4 In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009 (Air France), 760 F.
Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
5 Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
6 In re W. Caribbean Airways, S.A., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2007), affd
sub nom. Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2009).
7 See Carlos Ruiz & Allan I. Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens in jeopardy,
DRITODAY (Sept. 7, 2012), http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=418.
8 See infra note 65.
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the Cour de Cassation's opinion in West Caribbean and explain
the issues it poses for sovereignty. Finally, this article will offer
conclusions on the current state of forum non conveniens and
whether, going forward, there should be a clear policy for en-
couraging the application of forum non conveniens in suits by
foreigners in U.S. courts for air accidents occurring abroad.
I. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON AIR TRANSPORT
A. PURPOSES OF THE WARSAW AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS
The drafters of the 1929 Warsaw Convention wanted to de-
velop a treaty to achieve two goals for international civil aviation:
(1) establish uniformity in the legal systems; and (2) balance the
interests of passengers and the then-newly-emerging air carrier
industry.' One way the Warsaw Convention sought to provide
uniformity was by establishing four fora in which a plaintiff
could obtain jurisdiction over a carrier: (1) at the flight's final
destination; (2) where the carrier was domiciled; (3) where the
carrier had its principal place of business; or (4) where the car-
rier had a place of business that made the contract. 0 The 1999
Montreal Convention added a fifth jurisdiction, permitting pas-
sengers to bring suit in the place where passengers have their
"principal and permanent residence" at the time of the accident
if the carrier provides carriage of passengers on its own aircraft
or through a commercial agreement." By establishing a uniform
set of rules, the interests of air carriers and passengers were bal-
anced because these rules helped even the playing field between
parties. The five fora in which a passenger could sue an air car-
rier represented a compromise because the passenger was lim-
ited to seeking recovery in only those five fora, but those fora
were virtually guaranteed.
9 ANDREAs F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw § 2.1 (2d ed. 1981). Although the
United States was not one of the charter members, it did send an observer to the
Warsaw Convention. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. RiEV. 497, 502 (1967). Soon after the
Warsaw Convention took effect, the U.S Department of State recommended rati-
fication. Id.
10 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air art. 28(1), Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention].
11 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air art. 33(2), May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350
[hereinafter Montreal Convention].
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Prior to the Warsaw Convention, there was no definite basis of
recovery for passengers or shippers. Because of the differing
standards among national laws governing air accidents, what a
passenger could recover in one country might be far less than
what a passenger might recover in another.1 2 "Some countries
treated all transportation accidents alike," while others distin-
guished between automobiles and public carriers and made spe-
cial provisions for aviation accidents."3 Compensation for
aviation accidents could be governed by a nation's contract law
or by its tort law." If contract law were a country's basis for re-
covery in an aviation accident, the air carrier might be liable
only for foreseeable damages, not all damages caused.' 5 Addi-
tionally, a carrier could limit or exclude its liability by contract."6
By contrast, if tort law governed aviation accident compensa-
tion, the air carrier would be liable for all damages caused, and
a plaintiff could potentially recover more.17
Another way the Warsaw Convention balanced the interests of
carriers and passengers was by limiting carriers' potential liabil-
ity for death or bodily injury to approximately $8,300.18 In a let-
ter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations recommending ratification of
the Warsaw Convention, Secretary Hull stressed the importance
of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits in aiding develop-
ment of the fledgling international air transport industry, posit-
ing that the limitations would afford air carriers "a more definite
and equitable basis" for determining insurance rates. 9 Hull
urged that this certainty would create lower operating expenses
and reduce transportation costs for passengers. 2 0 Additionally,
12 See LOWENFELD, supra note 9, § 2.1.
13 Id. § 1.5.
14 Id. § 1.31.
15 See id. § 1.52.
16 Prior to the Warsaw Convention, aviation claims under French law were
based on contract law. Id.
17 Aviation accidents have always been covered by the tort law system in the
United States. Id. § 1.31.
18 Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art. 22; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 9, at 499.
19 LOWENFELD, supra note 9, § 2.1 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A CON-
VENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES, S. Exec. Doc. No. G, at 3 (2d
Sess. 1934)). However, it is worth-noting Hull's argument is flawed because al-
though a hard limit on liability lowers a carrier's exposure to suit, it does not
necessarily create a better basis for valuing insurance.
20 Id.
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the increased stability of limits allowed carriers to attract more
investors and aided the overall development of international air
transportation .2 Despite initially ratifying the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the United States began pushing for increased liability
limits."2
The United States advocated strongly for increasing recov-
eries for victims to $100,000, but the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) insisted that $75,000 was the maximum limit
the world's insurance market could sustain. Unwilling to ratify
the 1955 Hague Protocol2 4-an amendment to the Warsaw Con-
vention-without an increase in carrier liability, the United
States submitted a notice denouncing the Warsaw Convention.
Prior to the denunciation's effective date, the United States
struck a compromise by proposing the adoption of absolute lia-
bility.26 The United States wanted increased limits primarily be-
cause litigation costs were so high.2 7 By coupling absolute
liability with the $75,000 cap, legal fees would be lower and vic-
tims' recovery would be commensurate with the United States'
proposed $100,000 limit.28 This compromise was further devel-
oped in the Montreal Convention's two-tier liability system in
Article 21.2
The Warsaw Convention shifted the burden of proof so that
the carrier was presumed liable unless it could show beyond a
doubt that it took "all necessary measures to avoid the dam-
age."o30 Thus, even though the limits of liability set forth in the
21 Id.
22 Allan I. Mendelsohn, Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum Non Conveniens, and the 1999
Montreal Convention, 10 ISSUEs AvIATION L. & POL'y 265, 272-73 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens & Montreal 99].
23 See id.
24 The Hague Protocol called for increasing the liability limit to only $16,600,
far below the United States' requested $100,000. Protocol to Amend the Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371; Lee S. Kreindler, The Denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 291, 292 (1965).
25 Kreindler, supra note 24, at 291. The Act of Denunciation was effective May
15, 1966. Id.
26 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No. 18,900, approved by
Exec. Order No. 23,680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal
Agreement].
27 See Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens & Montreal 99, supra note 22, at
272-73.
28 Id.
29 See Montreal Convention, supra note 11, art. 21.
30 Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art. 20.
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treaty may not have been as favorable for passengers as the pre-
vailing law in Germany, for example, the overall advantage to
passengers' rights was undeniable."' Developing a uniform, mul-
tinational approach to accident compensation in international
air transportation may have been the initial objective of the War-
saw Convention (and subsequent treaties), but that goal could
not be further from what resulted.
B. FRUSTRATION OF THE CONVENTIONS' PURPOSE
In advocating for the absolute liability provisions, the United
States hoped passengers would be able to avoid extensive and
prolonged litigation over issues of negligence and to recover
damages promptly, with minimal legal fees.32 Unfortunately, this
objective is frustrated when plaintiffs and their lawyers engage
in bad faith forum shopping or when the action is brought
against the manufacturer under products liability principles,
rather than against the air carrier on which the accident
occurred.
Plaintiffs found a number of ways around the liability and ju-
risdictional limits in the Warsaw Convention. If plaintiffs
brought suit under the Warsaw Convention against the air car-
rier on which the accident occurred, they were limited to an
award of $75,000 under the 1966 IATA Intercarrier Agree-
ment.34 But if the plaintiffs brought a products liability claim
against the manufacturers of the aircraft, the Warsaw liability
limits did not apply, and some U.S. states permitted the award of
punitive damages.35 To address this issue, the Montreal Conven-
tion's drafters adopted a two-tier system of liability.3 ' First, the
Montreal Convention increased strict liability limits up to
100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR), or $150,000 U.S.
(2012).17 Second, Montreal did away with liability limits for air-
lines and air carriers unless they could successfully bear the bur-
den of proving that the damage was not due to their negligence
31 See LOWENFELD, supra note 9, §§ 1.52-.53.
32 See Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens & Montreal 99, supra note 22, at
272-73; see also discussion supra Part I.A.
3 Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens & Montreal 99, supra note 22, at 274. If
plaintiffs bring a products liability claim against the manufacturers of the aircraft,
the Warsaw and Montreal liability limits do not apply. Id.
34 Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art. 22 ($8,300 converted to value in
2012); Montreal Agreement, supra note 26.
3 Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens & Montreal 99, supra note 22, at 274.
6 See Montreal Convention, supra note 11, art. 21.
37 See id. art. 21(1).
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or, alternatively, that it was due to the negligence of a third
party." Thus, even if an airline or air carrier bore only 1% of
the liability, it would be responsible for the full amount of dam-
ages allowed under local law.3 9
Because local law applies to damage awards under the Mon-
treal Convention, plaintiffs are still incentivized to forum shop
for countries that award higher damages. Moreover, because the
Montreal Convention bars punitive damages, plaintiffs will still
bring products liability claims against the manufacturer (or
other third parties) in an amenable forum, such as the United
States.40 Suing the manufacturers rather than the air carrier has
a jurisdictional benefit when U.S. courts have personal jurisdic-
tion over the manufacturer. Because products liability claims are
covered by tort law in the United States and are not governed by
the Warsaw or Montreal Conventions, plaintiffs can file suit in
U.S. courts even when the accident occurred abroad and the
carrier neither operates nor does business in the United
States.4 1
This type of forum shopping is not in violation of either the
Warsaw Convention or the Montreal Convention because a
plaintiff is entitled to choose the forum.4 2 However, because the
choice of forum in international litigation can be outcome de-
terminative, the perceived advantages of litigating a case in the
United States cause many foreign plaintiffs to file suit there. 3
This is often the case whether or not the plaintiff or the aviation
accident has any connection to the United States.44 For exam-
ple, the availability of potentially higher awards (punitive or
multiple damage awards), broader discovery rights, and contin-
gency fee lawyers all make the United States a far more attrac-
tive forum than most foreign countries.4 5 By contrast,
defendants often perceive the United States as unfavorable and
try to influence the choice of forum through various legal proce-
dural means, such as forum non conveniens; parallel proceed-
ings and motions to stay or dismiss in favor of the parallel
8 Id. art. 21(2).
9 See id. art. 33.
40 Id. art. 29.
41 Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens & Montreal 99, supra note 22, at 274.
42 Montreal Convention, supra note 11, art. 33(1) (describing jurisdiction as
chosen "at the option of the plaintiff"); Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art.
28(1).
4 Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens & Montreal 99, supra note 22, at 265.
44 Id.
4 Id.
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foreign proceedings; or antisuit injunctions. 6 Consequently, liti-
gation becomes a protracted battle, legal costs increase dramati-
cally, and the Conventions' purposes are frustrated.
II. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Forum non conveniens-Latin for "an unsuitable court"4 7 -is
a common law doctrine under which a court, as a matter of dis-
cretion, may decline to exercise jurisdiction when some signifi-
cantly more convenient alternative forum exists. 48 Foreign
plaintiffs are then required to "sue either in the courts of their
own country or, in the case of a foreign airline defendant, in a
court where that airline is headquartered."" Because foreign
plaintiffs often bring claims in U.S. courts in the hopes of using
contingency fee counsel and getting higher awards, the forum
non conveniens doctrine is an essential defense mechanism that
allows U.S. courts to dismiss cases, especially those with no
nexus to the U.S. forum.5 o
In the seminal case on forum non conveniens, Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno," the Supreme Court established a three-part test
for determining when a case may be dismissed for forum non
conveniens. First, the Court assessed the degree of deference to
accord to the plaintiffs choice of forum.5 2 In Gulf Oil v. Gilbert,
46 John Fellas, Strategy in International Litigation, HUGHEs HUBBARD & REED LLP
1, http://wwv.chadbourne.com/files/upload/CorpCounl-%20Fellas%20-%20
Strategy%20in%201nt'l%20Litigation.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
47 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2011).
48 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947) (stating that the forum
non conveniens doctrine "can never apply if there is an absence of jurisdiction"
elsewhere), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act ofJune 25, 1948, Pub. L. No.
80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012)), as recognized
in Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994); see Sinochem Int'l Co. v.
Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 434 (2007) (clarifying that ifjurisdic-
tion is clearly lacking, a court "must dismiss on that account," but that a court
may dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds "before definitively ascertaining
its own jurisdiction").
49 Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens & Montreal 99, supra note 22, at 268.
50 Forum non conveniens is an important procedural tool for courts dealing
with plaintiff "misuse of venue." Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507. U.S. jurisdictions that do
not use the forum non conveniens doctrine liberally are inundated with claims
for foreign accidents having little or no connection to the United States. See Fo-
rum Non Conveniens: Significant Developments in 2009, CONDON & FORSYTH LLP 1
(2010), http://www.condonlaw.com/newsletters/winter_2010.pdf. A leading
firm in aviation law, Condon & Forsyth, coined one such jurisdiction a "'Judicial
Hellhole."' Id. at 2.
51 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
52 Id. at 257 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 511-12).
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the Court observed that "unless the balance is strongly in favor
of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed."" When a plaintiff chooses his or her home fo-
rum, moreover, it is presumed to be convenient and is afforded
great deference.5 4
Second, the Court analyzed whether an adequate alternate fo-
rum existed. The Piper Court noted that the requirement for
an adequate alternative forum "will be satisfied when the defen-
dant is 'amenable to process' in the other jurisdiction." 6 Often,
a defendant airline making a forum non conveniens motion will
voluntarily consent to the jurisdiction of a foreign court and
waive statute of limitations defenses and any other potential de-
fenses it might have under Article 21(2) of the Montreal Con-
vention. Courts may condition forum non conveniens
dismissals upon these waivers by the defendant airline to ensure
that an alternative forum will exist.58 However, the alternate fo-
rum's "adequacy" does not necessarily require that the other
available forum guarantee a win for the plaintiff."5
Third, assuming that an adequate alternative forum existed,
the Court balanced the public and private factors weighing ei-
ther for or against dismissing for forum non conveniens.o Vari-
ous private factors include:
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compul-
sory process for attendance of unwilling [witnesses] and the cost
of obtaining attendance of willing[ ] witnesses; possibility of view
of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
53 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
54 Piper, 454 U.S. at 255.
55 Id. at 254 n.22.
56 Id. (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07); see, e.g., Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia
Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 433-34 (2007); Calavo Growers of Cal. v.
Generali Belg., 632 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The doctrine of forum non,
conveniens presupposes that an alternative forum is available.").
57 Monroe Leigh, Federal Jurisdiction-Forum Non Conveniens-Review of Condi-
tions ofDismissal Imposed by Trial Court-No Need to Require Consent to Enforceability of
Foreign Judgment-Equal Access of Parties to Evidence Under Applicable Discovery Rules,
81 AM. J. INT'L L. 415, 415 (1987); see also Montreal Convention, supra note 11,
art. 21(2).
58 Leigh, supra note 57.
59 See Piper, 454 U.S. at 252 n.19. But see id. at 254 n.22 ("[W]here the remedy
offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be
an adequate alternative . . . .").
60 Id. at 256; see Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d 146, 153
(2d. Cir. 2005); see also Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508; Clerides v. Boeing Co., 534 F.3d
623, 628-30 (7th Cir. 2008).
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other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious and inexpensive."1
The public interest factors that courts have listed include: ad-
ministrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the "local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home"; the
interest "in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is
at home with the state law that must govern the case"; the avoid-
ance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws or in the appli-
cation of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens
in an unrelated forum with jury duty.6 2
Although both the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
Convention state that the procedural rules of the court hearing
the case shall govern," the issue has been a hotbed for litigation
arising out of air accidents in recent years. There is an immense
disconnect between various courts' interpretations of whether
Warsaw or Montreal intended to include the forum non con-
veniens doctrine as a procedural right of the forum state. How-
ever straightforward this seems, several cases within the last few
years cast serious doubts upon the control that a U.S. court has
over its jurisdiction and, consequently, that the United States
has over its own sovereignty.
III. FORUM NON CONVENIENS UNDER
THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Article 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention provides that
"[q]uestions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the
Court seised of the case."64 Although this Article is seemingly
straightforward, there is a. serious disconnect between various
courts' interpretations of whether the Warsaw Convention in-
tended to include the forum non conveniens doctrine as a pro-
cedural right of the forum state. While the Montreal
Convention is the more recent international transportation
treaty, the Warsaw Convention will still apply to its signatories
that have not yet ratified Montreal.6" Therefore, it is still essen-
61 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
62 Id. at 508-09.
61 Montreal Convention, supra note 11, art. 33(4); Warsaw Convention, supra
note 10, art. 28(2).
64 Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art. 28(2).
65 Note that this problem may be less important than it initially appears. All
carriers operating in the United States, as part of their foreign air carrier permit,
have voluntarily agreed to be bound by the Montreal Convention no matter the
origin or destination of their passengers. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-.3. In addition,
2013] 329
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tial for any international litigator to be cognizant of Warsaw
Convention case law.
A. TWA 800
In 1996, Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 800 exploded
eight miles off the coast of Long Island shortly after departing
New York on a flight to France.6 6 The families of 145 of the de-
ceased passengers brought wrongful death suits against the air-
line, the manufacturer of the aircraft, and the manufacturer of
the aircraft's fuel pumps; the cases were consolidated in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York.6' The de-
fendants-Boeing (the airplane manufacturer) and TWA (the
airline)-sought to dismiss the suit in favor of a French forum.
In doing so, they agreed to voluntarily submit themselves to the
French court's jurisdiction and to not contest liability for full
compensatory damages." The defendants preferred the French
forum because France did not allow punitive damageso and be-
cause the plaintiffs might be disadvantaged by the defendants'
deep pockets-especially in the absence of contingency fee
representation."
the European Union adopted a regulation requiring European Community carri-
ers to apply the provisions of the Montreal Convention limits to all carriage of
passengers and their baggage by air. Council Regulation 889/2002 of 13 May
2002 Amending Council Regulation 2027/97 on Air Carrier Liability in the Event
of Accidents, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 140) 2 (EC).
66 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT: IN-FLIGHT BREAKuP
OVER THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES FLIGHT 800, at 1-4 (1996).
67 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, N.Y. on July 17, 1996, Nos. 96 Civ. 7986
(RWS) & MDL 1161 (RWS), 1998 WL 292333, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.June 2, 1998), aff'd,
209 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2000). The Multidistrict Panel on February 19, 1997, as-
signed all cases arising out of TWA 800 to the Southern District of New York. See
In re Air Crash Off Long Island, N.Y., on July 17, 1996 (TWA 800), 65 F. Supp. 2d
207 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Air Crash Off Long Island, N.Y., on July 17, 1996, 27 F.
Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), affd, 209 F.3d 200; In re Air Crash Off Long Island,
N.Y. on July 17, 1996, 1998 WL 292333, at *1.
68 TWA 800, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 209-10.
69 Id. To meet the second requirement of the Piper test that another alternative
forum exist, defendants will often waive defenses in the foreign jurisdiction. See
supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
70 7WA 800, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 216. Note that this case was decided under the
Warsaw Convention, which did not prohibit punitive damages. See id. at 212.
Under the Montreal Convention, punitive damages are prohibited against air car-
riers, no matter how gross the alleged conduct. See Montreal Convention, supra
note 11, art. 29.
71 See Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens &' Montreal 99, supra note 22, at 274.
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Balancing the private and public interest factors, the court
held that dismissal was inappropriate. The private factors, such
as availability of evidence and access to witnesses, were "a
wash."" The public interest factors, however, weighed heavily in
favor of keeping the case in the United States.7 4 The court noted
that it was unaware of any precedent dismissing a case for forum
non conveniens for an air accident occurring in U.S. territory.
The flight originated in the United States; the plane was manu-
factured by a U.S. company and flown by a U.S. carrier; and the
passengers were predominantly U.S. domiciliaries: "the pres-
ence of foreign plaintiffs (who chose to sue in the United
States) does not change the essentially American character of
this case."7 6
Despite the ultimate denial of the defendants' forum non
conveniens motion, this case is significant because the court
clearly recognized that, under the Warsaw Convention, Article
28(2)'s provision allows the forum's procedural rules to govern
and possibly prevail over a plaintiffs choice of forum under Arti-
cle 28(1)." The court acknowledged that it would be barred
from dismissing a suit brought under Article 28(1) of the War-
saw Convention but held that the treaty does not limit the court
from transfeming such suits to other fora not outlined in Article
28(1) because transfers are a procedural tool permitted by Arti-
cle 28(2)." Although forum non conveniens is actually a dismis-
sal, the court reasoned that it was not restricted by the four fora
in Article 28(1) because dismissals are considered transfers
when conditioned upon the subsequent alternative forum ac-
cepting the case.7 Compare this result with the conclusion
reached by the English Court of Appeals in the 1996 case Milor
v. British Airways.8 0
72 TWA 800, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
73 Id. at 215-16.
74 Id. at 217.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 214; Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art. 28(1) (listing the four
fora in which a plaintiff may bring suit); Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art.
28(2) ("Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to
which the case is submitted.").
78 7WA 800, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 212-14.
79 Id. at 212-13.
80 See Milor S.R.L. v. British Airways, Plc., [1996] Q.B. 702 (Eng.).
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B. MILoR v. BRITIsH AIRWAYS
In Milor, the shippers, consignees, and forwarding agents of
gold jewelry worth £750,000, or nearly $1.2 million,"1 consigned
the jewelry from Italy to Pennsylvania under an international
carriage of goods by air contract with the defendant air carrier.
Upon arrival in Pennsylvania, the jewelry disappeared from a
bonded warehouse while under the defendant's watch." The
plaintiffs filed suit in England's Commercial Court against the
defendant carrier to recover the value of the jewelry. 4 The de-
fendants moved to stay proceedings on the ground of forum
non conveniens, arguing that Pennsylvania was a more proper
forum because the crime occurred there-thus, the evidence
was located there-and because the defendants planned to
bring third party proceedings in that jurisdiction. However,
the lower court held there was no basis to challenge the plain-
tiffs' choice of forum as provided in Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention. 6
On appeal, the English Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court's decision, holding that the Warsaw Convention's text pre-
cluded application of the forum non conveniens doctrine; the
court of appeals reasoned that the "procedural power to stay on
the ground of forum non conveniens is . .. inconsistent with the
right conferred on the plaintiff to choose in which of the [four]
competent jurisdictions his action will be tried."" Under this in-
terpretation, "the scope of the forum state's procedural law in-
corporated by Article 28(2) is subject to Article 28(1), which
grants to the plaintiff an absolute right of choice as between
four presumptively convenient jurisdictions."8 8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit would later weigh the TWA 800 interpretation against the
"equally plausible interpretation" adopted by the Milor court in
one of the leading cases on the intersection between forum non
conveniens and the Warsaw Convention, Hosaka v. United Air-
lines, Inc."
81 Currency exchange determined by calculator on www.x-rates.com.
82 Milor, [1996] Q.B. at 705.
83 Id. at 702.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 706; cf TWA 800, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing
the "essentially American character" of the TWA 800 accident).
86 Milor, [1996] Q.B. at 706.
87 Id. at 707.
88 Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2002).
89 Id. at 994-95.
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C. HoSAIK4 V. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
In Hosaka, the plaintiffs brought claims under the Warsaw
Convention arising out of injuries sustained when their United
Airlines flight from Tokyo to Hawaii encountered turbulence
over the Pacific Ocean.o The Hosaka defendants moved to dis-
miss the suit for forum non conveniens, noting that every plain-
tiff "lives in Japan, works in Japan, is a citizen of Japan, received
medical care (if at all) in Japan, and otherwise sustained
whatever damages he or she sustained, in Japan."" The plain-
tiffs implored the court to adopt the ruling outlined in Milor v.
British Airways, but the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' ac-
tions in favor of a more convenient forum in Japan, holding that
the Warsaw Convention's provision of four fora in which an ac-
tion may be brought did not procedurally bar the court from
dismissing the suit for forum non conveniens.92 But on appeal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, holding
that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention overrides the dis-
cretionary power of federal courts to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds." The Ninth Circuit based its rationale on the
Warsaw Convention's purpose, the drafting history, and the
post-ratification understanding of Warsaw. 94
1. Text of the Treaty
The circuit court in Hosaka began by looking at the plain lan-
guage of the Warsaw Convention" and determined that Warsaw
was "silent on the availability" of forum non conveniens as a pro-
cedural tool." The Hosaka court next weighed the two "equally
plausible interpretations"9 7 of Article 28's language on questions
of jurisdiction and procedure: the TWA 800 and Milor courts'
9o Brief of Defendants/Appellees United Airlines, Inc. & UAL Corp. at 7,
Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-15223, 01-
15120).
91 Id.
92 Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 993.
93 Id. at 1004.
94 Id. at 1003.
95 When interpreting a treaty, a court must begin with the treaty's text. See id.
at 993 (citing El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167 (1999)).
96 Id. at 994 (noting that forum non conveniens was not explicitly referenced
anywhere in the treaty).
97 Id. The issue is whether Article 28(1) is an absolute right of the plaintiff
(Milor holding) or Article 28(2) plainly incorporates the forum state's procedural
law (TWA 800). Id. at 994-95.
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rationales." The circuit court reasoned 'that Article 28 was am-
biguous," but also that the court's rationale was conclusory.
First, it is "well established"' in U.S. case law that the forum
non conveniens doctrine is "'procedural rather than substan-
tive."""' Thus, questions of procedure, such as forum non con-
veniens, must be left to the court seized of the case, according to
Article 28. The inquiry should have stopped there, but the
Hosaka court reasoned that forum non conveniens was not offi-
cially recognized in U.S. jurisprudence at the time the Warsaw
Convention was drafted and, therefore, could not be one of the
procedural tools the drafters intended to apply. 0 2 But the
United States was not an original party to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, and all original signatories came from civil lawjurisdictions
that did not employ the forum non conveniens doctrine."os
Therefore, it makes little sense for the court to put such weight
on the absence of a doctrine that the parties to the Convention
did not utilize in their own countries. Even if the background of
forum non conveniens in U.S. jurisprudence was relevant, the
Hosaka court's history was mistaken.
While the term "forum non conveniens" was not employed in
the United States until 1929,104 the concept underlying the doc-
trine-that U.S. courts have the discretion to refuse jurisdiction
over a case-was certainly present as early as the 17th century.10
In the 1869 case Great Western Railway Co. of Canada v. Miller, the
court held:
98 See discussion supra Part III.A.-B.
99 Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 996 ("Where the text of a treaty is ambiguous, we may
look to the purposes of the treaty to aid our interpretation.").
100 Khan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 2080 (BMC), 2010 WL 3210717, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010).
101 Id. (quoting Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994)).
102 Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 1003. The first official U.S. recognition of forum non
conveniens was in 1947. See id.
193 Civil law countries objected to forum non conveniens language because
"the doctrine was unknown in their jurisdictions and ought not to be imposed
upon them by international treaty." Id. at 1000.
104 Id. at 1003. American Wall Street lawyer Paxton Blair published an entire
article on forum non conveniens in 1929. See Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1929).
105 Gregoire Andrieux, Declining Jurisdiction in a Future International Convention
on Jurisdiction and Judgments-How Can We Benefit from Past Experiences in Conciliat-
ing the Two Doctrines of Forum Non Conveniens and Lis Pendens ?, 27 Lov. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 323, 336-37 (2005); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAiF. L. Rrv. 380, 386-87 (1947).
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We think that when by the pleadings, or upon the trial, it appears
that our tribunals are resorted to for the purpose of adjudicating
upon mere personal torts committed abroad, between persons who
are all residents where the tort was committed, the inconveniences
and the danger of injustice attending the investigation of such
controversies render it proper to decline proceeding further. 106
Moreover, the fact that a new procedural rule crystallized
under domestic law only after the treaty was ratified cannot nec-
essarily foreclose its inclusion."o' If this were the norm, treaties
would be outdated before they were ratified, and international
law would lose credibility. Thus, the language of the Warsaw
Convention, which clearly states that any procedural law of the
forum state governs, should by consequence include the proce-
dural doctrine of forum non conveniens. 108
Even if the Hosaka court correctly concluded that the treaty's
text was ambiguous and required the court to engage in treaty
interpretation, the court certainly exceeded the scope of its
power by inserting its own interpretation of the treaty's
purposes.10
2. Purpose and Drafting History of the Warsaw Convention
Finding the plain text of the treaty ambiguous, the Hosaka
court next analyzed the treaty's purposes and drafting history 10
106 Great W. Ry. Co. of Can. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305, 315-16 (1869) (emphasis
added).
107 See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defend-
ants-Appellees at 28, Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir.
2009) (No. 07-15828).
108 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art. 28(2).
109 See Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 1003-04; Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S.
122, 134 (1989).
110 Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 993-94 ("If the plain text is ambiguous, we look to
other sources to elucidate the treaty's meaning, . . . including the purposes of the
treaty, its drafting history, the post[-]ratification understanding of the con-
tracting parties and the decisions of the courts of other signatories."). The Hosaka
court concluded that "forum non conveniens is inconsistent with the Conven-
tion's dual purposes of uniformity and balance." Id. at 997; see discussion supra
Part I.A. Ultimately adopting the Milor court's rationale, the Hosaka court noted
that the Warsaw Convention's signatories were not just creating uniformity in
liability, but also uniform rules of jurisdiction. Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 996. Forum
non conveniens disturbs uniform rules of jurisdiction by denying a plaintiff "the
right ... to sue in one of the four [fora] nominated in [A]rticle 28(1)." Id. at 997.
Additionally, allowing a defendant to cancel out a plaintiffs choice of forum
would disturb the balance struck between air carriers and their customers by re-
neging on a "deliberate benefit" to the plaintiff to choose one of the four juris-
dictions in which it enjoys a right to sue. Id.
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to see "the context in which the written words were used,""'
including the negotiations and the "practical construction
adopted by the parties."' 12 In so holding, the Hosaka court more
than likely, as shown below, failed in giving "the specific words
of the [Warsaw Convention] a meaning consistent with the
shared expectations of the contracting parties."" 3
The Hosaka court stated that the drafting history was "incon-
clusive" and determined that the failure to explicitly incorporate
forum non conveniens in the Warsaw Convention was not indic-
ative of "silently incorporating, or acquiescing in" its inclu-
sion. 4 Instead, the court reasoned that the contracting parties
intentionally left it out because it was "an alien concept" to "civil
law jurists" and "unwelcome by the majority of the contracting
parties" of the Warsaw Convention."' There are several
problems with these conclusions.
First, it was clear error for the Hosaka court to summarily con-
clude that the absence of explicit reference to forum non con-
veniens in Article 28 indicated the drafters did not intend for it
to apply."' In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., the
Supreme Court affirmed a Second Circuit decision but "re-
ject[ed] its declaration that the [Warsaw] Convention is pro-
spectively unenforceable.""' 7 The Court held that the lower
court erred in concluding that legislative silence abrogated the
treaty limitations absent clear intent by the political branches to
do so.' 18 Both Congress and the Executive Branch maintained
that the treaty limitations remained in force, took no steps to
otherwise repeal those provisions, and in fact continued to as-
sert the treaty's vitality."' Applying the same logic to the Hosaka
decision, the policy rationale behind the Warsaw Convention
I Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
112 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985).
11 See Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 994 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 399).
114 Id. at 998-99. At the Warsaw drafting conference, the British delegation
proposed expressly preserving a court's discretion to decline jurisdiction in Arti-
cle 28 if it was consistent with the forum state's procedural rules. Id. at 997. How-
ever, this language was never incorporated into Article 28 and it is unclear from
the official minutes why the language was never included. Id. at 997-98.
115 Id. at 999.
116 See id.
11 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 246 (1984).
118 Id. at 251-52.
119 Id. at 253.
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should also not be subject to second-guessing by the judiciary
absent clear intent from the other political branches. 20
The court in Hosaka disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's assump-
tion that the United States would not ratify a treaty that "for-
feit[ed] such a valuable procedural tool as the doctrine of
forum non conveniens," noting that there are "many possible
reasons" why the United States would exclude a forum non con-
veniens provision.'2 1 The court rationalized that because forum
non conveniens was not important until the 1947 Gilbert deci-
sion, it had "no difficulty imagining that the United States would
have sacrificed application of this modestly important procedu-
ral tool to obtain the benefits of the Convention." 2 2 However,
the Hosaka court conceded that the United States did not ex-
pressly forfeit this right.123
The Hosaka court clearly lacked the discretion to impose its
assumptions on what the United States might have bargained
for in ratifying the treaty, and its decision does not diminish the
doctrine's immense importance to the United States today-es-
pecially in light of the increased case load and the flood of for-
eign plaintiffs taking advantage of a generous forum. 1 24 Without
such an express forfeiture of the right, the Hosaka court severely
exceeded its authority in ruling in such a manner because fo-
rum non conveniens is a right intrinsic to the sovereign author-
ity of the United States over its own courts.1 2 1
Moreover, the court mentioned that the United States had
suggested amendments to the treaty that included express fo-
rum non conveniens language; the court decided that these sug-
gestions, combined with the United States' decision to sign the
treaty despite the absence of the amendments, were evidence
that the United States lost the battle to include that language.26
Although this is a possible theory, a more persuasive counter-
argument is that forum non conveniens was in fact an important
procedural tool because the United States specifically requested
its express inclusion.127 Thus, it is less likely that the United
States "sacrificed application" for the benefits of the Convention
120 See id. at 252-53; Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 996-97.
121 Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 1002.
122 Id. at 1003.
123 Id. at 1003-04.
124 See id.; supra note 50 and accompanying text.
125 See Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 1003-04.
126 Id. at 1000.
127 See id.
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and rather more likely that the United States reached a compro-
mise with the civil law countries to not include specific forums'
laws into the treaty.'"
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Airlines,
Inc. v. Floyd,'2 9 the Hosaka court reasoned that it could not adopt
a reading of Article 28 that "would [be] discordant or offensive
to the majority of signatories."s13  The Hosaka court's effort to
apply Floyd's rule to the forum non conveniens application of
Article 28 is illogical.'"' Extending the narrow concept of bodily
injury to cover emotional damages is hardly comparable to re-
fusing to permit certain types of judicial procedures under the
broad language of Article 28.132 Bodily injury under U.S. tort law
and foreign law specifically requires some physical injury that is
more than mental anguish.13 3 The Floyd plaintiff sought to claim
compensation solely for emotional damages absent physical
bodily injury.' The Supreme Court in Floyd would have ex-
panded the air carrier's liability dramatically under the Warsaw
Convention if it were to rule otherwise, ultimately disturbing the
balance sought in Warsaw between passengers and air carri-
ers.3 5 However, the same concern would not apply if the Hosaka
court read Article 28 to include the forum non conveniens
procedure.'3 6
Whereas Article 17's bodily injury remedy is narrow, Article 28
is a broad grant permitting a court's procedural laws to apply.13 7
Interpreting that one such type of procedural law may be ap-
plied to transfer a case, even if it happens to take away one of
the plaintiffs chosen forums, still cannot be construed as ex-
panding the scope of a provision that the 1929 drafters may well
128 See id. at 1003.
129 499 U.S. 530, 533-35 (1991) (declining to read Article 17 liability for pas-
sengers' "bodily injuries" to cover claims for purely emotional distress).
130 Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 998.
131 See id. at 999.
132 See id.
13 E.g., JEFFREY JACKSON, MISS. INS. LAw & PRAc. § 16:29 (No bodily injury
claim can arise where the only claim is "embarrassment, emotional distress, or
humiliation or damage to reputation."). The Supreme Court in Floyd noted that
no French legal materials, judicial decisions, or scholarly articles indicated that
the authentic French text of Article 17, "lesion corporelle," had any other mean-
ing than bodily injury and did not include psychic injuries. E. Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1991).
134 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 533.
3 Id. at 546.
13 See Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 998-99.
137 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, arts. 21, 28.
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have intentionally left vague (precisely as did the 1999 drafters
of Montreal's Article 33(4)).xss In short, forum non conveniens
is a procedural rule and therefore should be permitted under
Article 28.'"9 The Hosaka court's assumption that forum non
conveniens could not be read into Article 28 because it would
be offensive to signatory states is also flawed. 14 0
D. "TOMATO, TAMAHTO": Lis PENDENS IN
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
Forum non conveniens is not necessarily unwelcome in civil
law jurisdictions. Instead, it seems that civil lawjurisdictions sim-
ply developed a different legal procedure to dispose of "inconve-
nient cases" and provide for judicial economy. For example,
most of the Warsaw Convention's signatories employ the lis
pendens doctrine.1 4 ' Under the lis pendens doctrine, judges are
afforded the discretion to stay the proceedings where the same
case is pending in two different courts. 1 42 Similar to the way in
which the United States uses forum non conveniens, lis pendens
is used in civil law countries to avoid parallel litigation and en-
sure judicial economy.' Forum non conveniens and lis
pendens should not be confused with one another because they
are distinct legal doctrines. However, allowing a court's proce-
dural rules to govern under the Warsaw Convention's Article 28
is essentially providing: 'You say lis pendens, I say forum non
conveniens."144
138 See id. art. 28; Montreal Convention, supra note 11, art. 33(4).
139 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, arts. 21, 28; Montreal Convention,
supra note 11, art. 33(4).
140 See Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 998.
141 Martine Stnickelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague
Conference, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 949, 958 (2001); see Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 21-23,
Sept. 27, 1968, 1262 U.N.T.S. 153 [hereinafter Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction].
142 Stuckelberg, supra note 141, at 959.
143 See id.; discussion infra Part IV.A.
144 This is a play on the famous George Gershwin lyrics from "Let's Call the
Whole Thing Off' in which two characters pronounce the same word differently,
such as "tomato" and "tomahto." George Gershwin-Let's Call the Whole Thing Off
SONGMEANINGS, http://www.songmeanings.net/songs/view/3530822107859046
744 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). Worried that this fundamental disagreement
might force the couple to "call the whole thing off' or break up, the man offers
to adopt his partner's pronunciation. See id. To him, it does not matter what term
is used so long as they understand each other and they stay together as a couple.
See id. Similarly, the Warsaw Convention drafters' ultimate goal was to draft a
uniform agreement concerning air carrier liability with as many states ratifying
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Treaties are complex arrangements and can involve many sov-
ereign nations. By consequence, it is difficult to obtain an agree-
ment regarding a treaty, and some degree of flexibility in
language is necessary to encourage nations to ratify the treaty.
Because of the myriad of procedural laws differing between
each signatory, the treaty language would become bogged down
if the details of signatories' procedural laws were explicitly in-
cluded. Moreover, civil law states did not want forum legal doc-
trines forced upon them within their own territory.14 5 By
adopting broad treaty language in Article 28 and not specifying
what procedural laws do or do not apply, each party was able to
keep some degree of sovereignty. Consequently, more parties
may have been willing to ratify the treaty and were not forced to
"call the whole thing off."4 6
1. Post-Ratification Understanding: Other Treaties' Applications of
Forum Non Conveniens
The court deemed it "instructive" that the Brussels Conven-
tion governing enforcement of judgments among European
Union countries contains no express language on forum non
conveniens, and scholars have concluded that this silence must
be construed as barring the doctrine's application.14 7 However,
the Hosaka court's reliance on the Brussels Convention, a treaty
drafted nearly forty years after the Warsaw Convention, is
perplexing. 4 8
The Brussels Convention was drafted "to establish an expedi-
tious procedure for securing the recognition and enforcement
of judgments . . . [within] the European Economic Commu-
the Convention as possible. See supra Part I.A. Whether the countries use lis
pendens or forum non conveniens, both are procedures of the court, so why risk
having to call the whole treaty off over terminology?
145 The Hosaka court was aware of the potential for this type of conflict be-
tween civil law and common law countries, noting that in drafting the 1999 Mon-
treal Convention, "[a] ttempts were made by delegates from common law states to
introduce language which would specifically permit the application of the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens." Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 999-1000. However,
"[c]onsiderable objections were made by delegates from various civil law jurisdic-
tions" because "the doctrine was unknown in their jurisdictions and ought not to
be imposed upon them by international treaty." Id. at 1000.
16 See supra note 144.
147 Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 1001.
148 See id. at 1001-02.
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nity."14 9 Whereas the purpose of the Warsaw Convention is es-
tablishing uniformity in substantive rules of air carrier liability,
the provisions of the Brussels Convention outline and clarify pro-
cedural rules to ensure judgments are enforced and recog-
nized.1 5 0 Consequently, the Hosaka court compared apples to
oranges when it reasoned that the Brussels Convention's silence
on forum non conveniens shed light on the Warsaw drafters'
intent. 1
The Hosaka court made it clear that it was offering "no opin-
ion as to whether the text and drafting history of the Montreal
Convention demonstrate whether forum non conveniens would
be available."1 52 Thus, the opinion very clearly does not extend
to the 1999 Montreal Convention. 15 However, Hosaka is still rel-
evant because it applies to countries that are signatories to the
Warsaw Convention and not to the Montreal Convention.1 5 4
Also, courts often cite the Hosaka court's discussion on the Mon-
treal Convention's negotiating history.' Although much of the
language in the Montreal Convention is the same as the lan-
guage in the Warsaw Convention, "the Montreal Convention is
an entirely new treaty" requiring a new interpretation.1 5 1
IV. FORUM NON CONVENIENS UNDER
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
Article 33(4) of the Montreal Convention states: "Questions
of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court seised of
the case."" In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York distinguished the ruling in Hosaka by analyzing
the forum non conveniens doctrine with respect to the 1999
149 Adam R. Schwartz, In re Harrod's Ltd.: The Brussels Convention and the Proper
Application of Forum Non Conveniens to Non-Contracting States, 15 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 174, 176-77 (1991).
Iso See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, arts. 21-24; discus-
sion supra Part I.A.
151 See Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 1001-02.
152 Id. at 1001 n.17.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See, e.g., In re W. Caribbean Airways, S.A., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1308-09
(S.D. Fla. 2007), affd sub nom. Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052 (11th
Cir. 2009).
156 See Khan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 2080(BMC), 2010 WL 3210717,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010); see also Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366,
371 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004).
157 Montreal Convention, supra note 11, art. 33(4).
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Montreal Convention.'15 The Khan court noted that it was "well
established" that the forum non conveniens doctrine was "pro-
cedural rather than substantive."1 5 ' Thus, the court only looked
to the express language in Article 33(4) of the Montreal Con-
vention-establishing that procedural questions are governed
by the forum state-and concluded that it had the discretion to
dismiss a case brought under the Montreal Convention on fo-
rum non conveniens grounds."'o Consequently, it is now well es-
tablished that even if forum non conveniens did not apply
under the Warsaw Convention, courts have interpreted it to ap-
ply under the Montreal Convention."6 '
In the future, foreign plaintiffs bringing cases arising out of
air crashes abroad under the 1999 Montreal Convention will
need to be very resourceful in attempting to defeat motions to
dismiss for forum non conveniens. Recent case law illustrates
that plaintiffs will engage in interesting defendant swaps and liti-
gation gymnastics to protect their choice of a U.S. forum.
A. AIR FRANCE AND BAD FAITH PLAINTIFFS
Following the June 2009 crash of the Air France flight operat-
ing from Brazil to Paris, the victims' families sued Airbus (the
airline manufacturer) and various component parts manufactur-
ers in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia. 12 In 2010, the court dismissed all Air France Flight 447
cases for forum non conveniens, ruling that the families of the
228 passengers (including only two U.S. citizens) should have
filed suit in France.16 3 The threshold question was whether dis-
missal for forum non conveniens was even available following
the Ninth Circuit's Hosaka decision.164
Deciding that forum non conveniens was available under the
1999 Montreal Convention, the court concluded that the forum
non conveniens doctrine was well-recognized at the time the
1999 Montreal Convention was adopted, and sufficient drafting
history supported application of the doctrine."' When balanc-
158 Khan, 2010 WL 3210717, at *2.
159 Id. (quoting Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994)).
160 Id.
161 See id.
162 In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, 760 F. Supp. 2d 832,
835-36 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
163 Id. at 835.
164 Id. at 839-41.
165 Id. at 840.
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ing the public and private interests, the judge agreed that the
United States had a legitimate interest in "ensuring the quality
of component parts on aircraft," but because the flight was
headed for France and had far more French than U.S. passen-
gers, U.S. interests were "not sufficient to justify the enormous
commitment ofjudicial time and resources."1 6 6 Additionally, the
court found that evidence would be obtained more easily
abroad -because a criminal investigation into the cause of the
crash was taking place in France at the same time, and defend-
ants "agreed to provide all of their evidence in France.""'
After the U.S. district court granted the forum non con-
veniens dismissal, the plaintiffs' counsel did not re-file their case
in the French forum. Instead, they dropped all the European
defendants and re-filed their suit in the United States without
the European nationals originally included as plaintiffs, arguing
that dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds was no longer
possible because there could be no jurisdiction in the French
courts for a suit brought by non-French plaintiffs against non-
French defendants.16 s Although the plaintiffs were accurate that
forum non conveniens was no longer possible without the alter-
native available forum, the court nonetheless dismissed the case
based solely on the plaintiffs' bad faith and improper
conduct.'"'
The Air France case plays an interesting role in the historical
evolution of courts' treatment of forum non conveniens cases
because it illustrates a willingness by the United States to dismiss
a case for forum non conveniens even when there are American
plaintiffs involved and the majority of products liability evidence
rests in the United States.170 This could signify that courts are
166 Id. at 845.
167 Id. at 844.
168 Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's October 4, 2010 Or-
der on Forum Non Conveniens at 2, In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on
June 1, 2009, 760 F. Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 10-02144 CRB); see In
re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, 760 F. Supp. 2d 832, 845
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (the removal of the European plaintiffs mitigates the public
interest argument that France was more interested in the litigation).
169 In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic onJune 1, 2009, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1095-96 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that "a long line of jurisprudence holds that a
plaintiff whose case is dismissed for forum non conveniens must litigate in the
foreign forum in good faith"); see, e.g., Gutierrez v. Advanced Med. Optics, Inc.,
640 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011); MBI Grp., Inc. v. Credit Foncier Du Came-
roun, 616 F.3d 568, 573-74 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Huang v. Advanced Battery Techs.,
Inc., No. 09-8297, 2011 WL 813600, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011).
170 See In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 842-43.
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being more protective of their resources due to the ever-increas-
ing international litigation that U.S. courts face.' 7 1 More impor-
tantly, Air France illustrates the evolution of the lengths
plaintiffs' counsel will go to in order to bully their way into a
U.S. forum, and also how courts adapt and tweak the law to
maintain control over their dockets. 7 2
The most recent case on forum non conveniens in the avia-
tion context, In re West Caribbean Airways,'17 further illustrates
that forum non conveniens litigation has reached very conten-
tious levels in the international community.
B. IN RE WEST CARIBBEAN AND THE SUBORDINATION
OF U.S. LAWS
Following a 2005 airplane crash over Venezuela while en
route from Panama to Martinique, the survivors of the victims,
152 residents of Martinique, filed suit against (1) Newvac Corpo-
ration, a Florida corporation; (2) Newvac's owner, Jacques
Cimetier; and (3) West Caribbean Airways, a Columbian flag
carrier that did not fly to or do business in the United States. 1 74
The plaintiffs argued that suit in the United States was appropri-
ate under Article 39 of the Montreal Convention because
Newvac met the definition of a "contracting carrier" and was
domiciled and had its principal place of business in Florida.'7 5
West Caribbean Airways moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
jurisdiction, while Newvac and Cimetier moved to dismiss the
case on forum non conveniens grounds."' Relying on the three-
part test outlined in Piper Aircraft, Cimetier and Newvac con-
tended that Martinique was an "adequate alternative forum" be-
cause Martinique was both the place of destination and where
all the passengers had their principal and permanent residence
at the time of the accident."' Martinique was an available forum
to the plaintiffs as citizens of Martinique, and the plaintiffs
171 See id.
172 See id.
i7 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2007), affd sub nom. Pierre-Louis v.
Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2009).
174 See Allan I. Mendelsohn & Carlos J. Ruiz, The United States vs. France: Article
33 of the Montreal Convention and the Doctrine ofForum Non Conveniens, 77J. AIR L. &
COM. 467 (2012) (providing a detailed account of the case, facts, and procedural
history of In re West Caribbean).
175 In re W Caribbean, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03.
176 Mendelsohn & Ruiz, The United States vs. France, supra note 174, at 470.
177 Motion & Supporting Memorandum of Law of Defendants Jacques Cime-
tier, Newvac Corp., & G02 Galaxy, Inc. to Dismiss on Grounds of Forum Non
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could therefore bring suit in Martinique without undue incon-
venience or prejudice because West Caribbean Airways had al-
ready agreed to waive its defense and submit to Martinique's
jurisdiction.1 7 8 Finally, relevant public and private interests
weighed in favor of dismissing to Martinique because, as the
domiciliary forum, its court was in the best position to deter-
mine how its citizens should be compensated.1 7 9
The defendants further relied on the 1999 Montreal Conven-
tion's Article 33(4), arguing that forum non conveniens was in
fact a recognized procedural tool.' The plaintiffs argued on
the other hand that forum non conveniens could not be used to
defeat their right of choice of forum as provided to them under
Article 33(1)." Whether the court could use forum non con-
veniens as a procedural tool under Article 33(4) was a case of
first impression in U.S. courts.'12 As such, the U.S. Department
ofJustice submitted a Statement of Interest detailing the travaux
preparatoires of the Montreal Convention, which supported the
conclusion that the drafters clearly intended that forum non
conveniens be used as a procedural tool under Article 33(4).13
Writing for the district court, Judge Ursula Ungaro agreed and
dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds, leaving as
the only outstanding issue the amount of damages to be
awarded under and according to Martinique law.184
The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision;
the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court
was later denied.'8 5 The indefatigable plaintiffs, however, chose
not simply to bring their case in Martinique, but rather re-
quested that the Martinique court reject the U.S. district court's
decision by refusing to hear the case.'"'
The trial court in Martinique, however, agreed with Judge Un-
garo's opinion that dismissal was proper and that Article 33(4)
Conveniens at 7-9, In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (No. 06-22748), ECF No. 54.
178 Id. at 11-12.
179 Id. at 12-16.
'so In re W Caribbean, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
18, Id.
182 Id. at 1309.
183 Id. at 1328.
184 Id.
185 Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052, 1061 (11th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3387 (2010).
186 Ruiz & Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens injeopardy, supra note 7.
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allowed the use of forum non conveniens.'8 7 The French Cour
d'Appel affirmed the lower Martinique court's decision.' But
on final appeal in 2011 to the highest French court, the Cour de
Cassation, the plaintiffs finally had their victory.'"" The Cour de
Cassation adopted the plaintiffs' arguments that a U.S. court
could not use a domestic procedural law to defeat the plaintiffs'
right to their choice of forum under Article 33(1) and dismissed
the case back to the U.S. court.'
Armed with the Cour de Cassation's decision, the plaintiffs
returned to Judge Ungaro and requested that she vacate her
earlier order; the plaintiffs argued that the threshold. require-
ment for forum non conveniens-the existence of an adequate
alternative forum-was no longer met following the Cour de
Cassation's dismissal."' Nevertheless, Judge Ungaro denied the
plaintiffs' motion, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim that fail-
ure to vacate would cause them "extreme and undue hard-
ship"'9 2 was "more than disingenuous-it [was] ridiculous." 9 3
The plaintiffs chose to risk the available Martinique forum in
favor of potentially greater financial rewards in the U.S. fo-
rum.' Thus, to vacate the motion would be an "utter abroga-
tion of the forum non conveniens doctrine,"' 9 "sanction . . .
disrespect" for U.S. courts, and "encourage other litigants to en-
gage in similar conduct."' Judge Ungaro very assiduously
noted that if a foreign court is willing to turn its own citizens
away, then U.S. courts should feel no obligation to "devote re-





191 The "Bapte" Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(6) Motion to Vacate Judgment Because
Martinique is Not an Available Forum & Incorporated Memorandum of Law at
1-2, In re W. Caribbean Airways, No. 06-22748, 2012 WL 1884684 (S.D. Fla. May
16, 2012) (No. 06-22748), ECF No. 273.
192 In re W. Caribbean Airways, No. 06-22748, 2012 WL 1884684, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
May 16, 2012); The Bapte Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(6) Motion, supra note 191, at 9.
193 In re W Caribbean Airways, 2012 WL 1884684, at *9.
194 Id. at *10.
195 Id. at *8 (citing Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676 (S.D.
Tex. 2004)).
196 Id. at *12.
197 Id. at *8 (citing Scotts Co. v. Hacienda Loma Linda, 2 So. 3d 1013, 1017-18
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
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V. WAS THE FRENCH DECISION IN IN RE WEST
CARI BBEAN "LAWFARE"?
The French Cour de Cassation's decision might constitute
"lawfare." Lawfare is traditionally defined as "the use of law as a
weapon of war against a military adversary."' 9" While applying
the term lawfare to the forum non conveniens discussion does
not fit the traditional uses of the term, it is appropriate to ex-
tend the definition when one country attempts to subordinate
another country's laws beneath its own.'9 Such subordination
of laws infringes on the latter country's sovereignty, which is a
violation of customary international law. The decision by
France's Cour de Cassation can be seen, at best, as an affront to
international law and comity and, at worst, a violation of U.S.
sovereignty. 200 Describing the French court's decision as lawfare
may be hyperbolic, but it is certainly worth discussing.
According to the director of the Lawfare Project, "[Lawfare]
must be defined as a negative phenomenon to have any real
meaning. Otherwise, we risk diluting the threat and feeding the
inability to distinguish between that which is the correct applica-
tion of the law, on the one hand, and that which is lawfare, on
the other."2 0 1 Consequently, analyzing whether the Cour de Cas-
sation's recent decision was lawfare could help the legal commu-
nity understand the threat the decision poses to U.S.
sovereignty, the Montreal Convention, and international law.
A. AN AFFRONT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMITY
The lawfare analysis requires consideration of the following
question: "'What is the intention?' behind the legal action: Is it
to pursue justice, . . . or is the intent to undermine the very
system of laws being manipulated?" 20 2 In the context of the
Montreal Convention, does the French court's conclusion fur-
ther the purposes of the Convention (uniformity and the bal-
ancing of carrier-passenger interests), or does it manipulate the
treaty language to support an outcome the French court
prefers?
198 Luban, supra note 1, at 457.
199 See sources cited supra note 2. The Lawfare Project lists five goals of mod-
ern-day lawfare, one of which is "[t]o delegitimize the sovereignty of democratic
states." What Is Lawfare?, supra note 2.
200 See Ruiz & Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens in jeopardy, supra note 7.
201 What Is Lawfare?, supra note 2.
202 Id.
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The Cour de Cassation's opinion was an affront to interna-
tional law because it departed from accepted methods of treaty
interpretation by completely ignoring both the travaux
preparatoires of the 1999 Montreal Convention and the decisions
of its own two lower courts. 203 Nor did the Cour de Cassation
respect the international comity standard by at least examining
the well-considered and detailed conclusions reached by Judge
Ungaro and the Eleventh Circuit.20 This is not altogether sur-
prising considering that the French courts not only seem to en-
joy a reputation for imposing their interpretations of law on
other countries,'2 5 but also that civil law countries pay little def-
erence to their own intermediary courts' decisions.206 However,
it is widely accepted both in U.S. courts and in international law
that treaty interpretation must be based on the treaty's text and
context, including the negotiations and travaux preparatoires.2 0 7
By not basing its decision on these basic treaty interpretation
constructs, the Cour de Cassation ultimately defeated the funda-
mental purposes that the Montreal Convention and its predeces-
sor, the Warsaw Convention, sought to uphold: uniformity in
rules of liability and adequate limits on liability.20o This is a viola-
tion of international law because both Conventions are interna-
tional treaties to which France is a signatory and thus has an
obligation to uphold under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda-
"promises must be kept."20 9 The Cour de Cassation was cer-
tainly-or certainly should have been-cognizant that neither
Newvac nor Cimetier were insured in the United States and that
its citizens would riot receive adequate reparations without such
insurance. 21 0 This hardly serves to balance the interests of the
plaintiffs in receiving reparations under the Montreal Conven-
tion.21 ' Moreover, the Cour de Cassation's decision eradicates
the balance that the Convention tried to promote.
203 Ruiz & Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens in jeopardy, supra note 7.
204 Id.
205 See LOWENFELD, supra note 9, at 7-14 (noting that since the French Revolu-
tion, "France has done a great export trade in law").
206 Id. ("[I]ntermediate appellate courts [in civil law countries] tend to have
more freedom to review lower court findings of fact and in some countries (e.g.,
France) are empowered to make their own findings de novo.").
207 See supra note 95.
208 See discussion supra Part I.A.
209 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1217 (9th ed. 2009).
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The Montreal Convention attempted to create a system of lia-
bility that was fair to both air carriers and passengers.213 A rule
of law that condones, indeed encourages, a plaintiffs forum
shopping and the wasteful use of judicial time and resources
hardly instills fairness in the system. In West Caribbean, the plain-
tiffs' conduct was equally as improper as the Air France plaintiffs'
conduct.21 I Following Judge Ungaro's dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds, the plaintiffs chose to continue to dispute
her decision in the alternate French forums rather than accept
the decision.2 15 This bad faith forum shopping hardly serves to
foster the Montreal Convention's purposes of uniformity and
consistency in the application of rules."' Not only does the
Cour de Cassation's decision defeat policy rationales, but the de-
cision also casts aside established principles of international law
and hence violates the United States' sovereignty.21"
The Cour de Cassation's decision also violated the customary
international law of "comity." Comity refers to the spirit of coop-
eration that a court adopts when resolving cases that touch the
laws and interests of other sovereign states.2 18 First defined in
the 1895 case Hilton v. Guyot, the U.S. Supreme Court described
comity as
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recog-
nition which one nation allows within its territory to the legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws. 2 19
Thus, the French high court's refusal to enforce the U.S.
judgment does not necessarily violate a legal requirement, but it
is a foundational part of customary international law that a state
will recognize another nation's judgments. 2 20 The notion be-
hind this is reciprocity; in other words, "tit for tat" among states.
The Cour de Cassation's refusal to respect the U.S. court's fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal could lead U.S. courts to ignore
213 See discussion supra Part I.A.
214 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
215 Ruiz & Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens in jeopardy, supra note 7.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
219 Id.
220 See Ruiz & Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens in Jeopardy, supra note 7.
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French decisions if the roles are reversed.2 2 ' The French court's
decision may even be regarded as a direct act of defiance of U.S.
sovereignty.2 2 2
B. AN ArACK ON U.S. SOVEREIGNTY
It is well recognized that law, as well as arms, are two means of
waging war on other countries. A 2005 U.S. Department of De-
fense paper suggests that some foreign powers attack the United
States by "employ[ing] a strategy of the weak," by manipulating
"international fora and judicial processes. "223 Following the Sep-
tember 2001 terrorist attacks, Colonel CharlesJ. Dunlap first de-
scribed the rise of law as a prime feature of modern warfare; he
also pointed to the direct role that lawyers often play.224 He
noted that "the rule of law is being hijacked into just another
way of fighting."2 2 5 Similarly, the recent decision by the French
Cour de Cassation evidenced a "hijacking" of U.S. courts. 2
One of the most ancient and recognized rules of international
law governing jurisdiction is that the sovereign has power to ad-
judicate within its own territory.227 Thus, a sovereign's control
over whether to hear a case is, by consequence, -a sovereign
right.2 28 Given the frequency with which foreign plaintiffs avail
themselves of the benefits of U.S. forums, the French high
court's decision is a huge infringement on that right.22 9 Effec-
tively, the opinion demands that the United States submit to the
French court's ruling on when the United States may decline to
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 5 (2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d2005
0318nds2.pdf.
224 Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Hu-
manitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts 6 (Carr Ctr. for Human Rights, John F.




226 See id.; Ruiz & Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens in Jeopardy, supra note 7.
227 Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488,
497 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[F]orum non conveniens finds its roots in the inherent
power of the courts 'to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases."' (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.
32, 43 (1991))).
228 See id.
229 See Ruiz & Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens in jeopardy, supra note 7.
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adjudicate cases within its own territory.2 o The United States
should have the right to limit access to its courts just as it has the
right to limit access to its borders. To allow foreign countries to
dictate the terms by which the United States exercises its right to
adjudicate would inevitably control how U.S. case law is shaped
and what precedent develops in the future. In fact, the interna-
tional community has strongly rebuked the United States for ex-
actly that type of sovereign infringement with respect to
obtaining evidence abroad.3
In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, the U.S. court sanctioned
a Canadian citizen for failing to produce subpoenaed evidence
that was not only located in Canada but also illegal to produce
under Canadian law. 3 Despite this showing, the U.S. court held
that neither the existence of the conflicting Canadian law nor
the location of the evidence prevented the court from ordering
production of the evidence, provided that (1) the court had per-
sonal jurisdiction over the person; and (2) the person had con-
trol over the evidence.3 The Canadian government submitted
a diplomatic note to the U.S. Ambassador stating that such ac-
tion "subordinate [d] [Canada] to the procedures of U.S.
courts." 2 3 Furthermore, the U.S. court's failure "to recognize
the authority of the Canadian government to prohibit such dis-
closure would be contrary to generally accepted principles of
international law and would have an adverse impact on relations
between the United States and Canada.""2  In layman's terms,
Canada saw the U.S. ruling as an infringement on its sovereign
authority to prescribe laws within its jurisdiction, a subordina-
tion of its laws to those of the United States, and consequently, a
violation of customary international law. 3 Similarly, France's
Cour de Cassation holding subordinated the United States to
230 See id.
231 RALPH G. STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON THE RISE OF INTERMESTIC LAw 296 (2002) (suggesting that the U.S. court
system's allowance of expansive pretrial discovery is seen as a "unilateral, extrater-
ritorial, [and] invasive ... violation of [foreign governments'] sovereign preroga-
tive [s]"); seeJames H. Carter, Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAw. 5 (1979).
232 In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1143, 1150 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
233 Id.
234 Diplomatic Note from Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs to
the Ambassador of the United States of America (Nov. 8, 1978), in Canadian Prac-
tice in International Law During 1978 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and
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the procedures France has prescribed.2 3 7 As described earlier,
these French-prescribed procedures are highly questionable
under the Montreal Convention.23
The Hague Evidence Convention, adopted in 1970, was an ef-
fort to prevent the types of international conflicts illustrated by
In re Uranium.23 9 This is exactly what needs to be done with re-
spect to the forum non conveniens issues under the Montreal
Convention. The lawfare of forum non conveniens is not going
to disappear, and as illustrated by the evolution of cases on this
issue, it is only getting more contentious. The issue of forum
non conveniens is best addressed through a treaty revision or an
independent treaty on the subject.
VI. DISARMING THE "LAWFARE" OF
FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Whether or not labeling the forum non conveniens case his-
tory as lawfare is hyperbolic, the ratcheting up of tensions over
forum non conveniens is undeniable: from courts' corner-cut-
ting on the Gilbert factors, to bad faith plaintiffs, to courts refus-
ing to acknowledge other sovereign courts' decisions. The
forum non conveniens hostilities in the legal arena seem to in-
crease with each new case, and there needs to be a detente. The
best method to disarm the international community over forum
non conveniens is to develop a new treaty provision. Whether
the parties agree on a procedural tool or "agree to disagree"
going forward, something needs to be resolved before the issue
escalates further. An additional measure might be to limit the
types of defendants that passengers may sue under Montreal.
A. REQUIRING MONTREAL TO BE PASSENGERS' EXCLUSIVE
CAUSE OF ACTION
One scholar proposed that U.S. courts should require the vic-
tims of international air crashes to bring their claims "exclu-
sively and only against the airline on which the death or injury
occurred."2 4 0 This scholar's proposal was inspired by the 1999
Supreme Court decision in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng."
237 See Ruiz & Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens in jeopardy, supra note 7.
238 See discussion supra Part V.A.
239 See Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention];
In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1143-44 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
240 Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens 6f Montreal 99, supra note 22, at 275.
241 Id.; see El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
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In Tseng, the plaintiff brought suit against El Al Israel Airlines
for injuries sustained prior to boarding her flight.24 2 Relying on
the language in Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention, which pro-
vides that "cases covered by Article 17" may only be brought
"subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
[C] onvention, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention
provides the sole causes of action for which a plaintiff can bring
a claim against an airline. 244 Because Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention requires injuries to occur during "embarking or dis-
embarking,"24 5 the plaintiff had no claim under the Convention
as her injuries occurred prior to boarding the flight.24 6 Ex-
tending the ruling in Tseng, U.S. courts could avoid many forum
non conveniens confrontations if victims seeking damages for a
death or injury aboard an aircraft were unable to bring suit
against the aircraft or component parts manufacturers. The
plaintiffs would be limited to suing only the airline on which the
death or injury occurred.4 While this proposal would not fore-
close all future forum non conveniens lawfare,24 9 it would cer-
tainly provide more uniformity in both passengers' and carriers'
expectations.
In conclusion, limiting plaintiffs to filing suit against only the
airline would be more consistent with the fundamental goals of
uniformity and balancing carrier-passenger interests that the
Conventions sought to achieve when adopting absolute liability
limits. Victims would recover. damages more expeditiously be-
cause there would be less legal red tape, and lawyers' fees would
be lower because of the quicker process. Consequently, plaintiffs
might well receive more damages because less money would be
paid to lawyers. The airline would not be harmed by such a sys-
tem either because the airline could always bring a claim
242 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161.
243 Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art. 24.
244 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161.
245 Warsaw Convention, supra note 10, art. 17.
246 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 166.
247 Mendelsohn, Forum Non Conveniens & Montreal 99, supra note 22, at 277.
248 See id.
249 This proposal does not necessarily stop forum non conveniens lawfare alto-
gether because, even if suit were limited to the airline, forum non conveniens
might still be relevant where the accident occurs abroad but a plaintiff can still
obtain jurisdiction through one of the five fora. See Montreal Convention, supra
note 11, arts. 33(1)-(2). TWA 800 and Air France are perfect examples of cases
where the airline could be sued in the United States.
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directly against the responsible manufacturer. Thus, the Con-
ventions' goals of uniformity and balancing carrier-passenger
interests would be greatly enhanced.
THE DELIMITATION BETWEEN AIRSPACE AND
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ABSTRACT
Although the legal border between airspace and outer space
still awaits international agreement, this lacuna has not given
rise to significant difficulties in the determination of applicable
law with respect to traditional flight craft-aircraft and space ob-
jects-due to their separated spheres of activity. The emergence
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of aerospace objects' does not justify the urgency of delimita-
tion. In the alternative, the difficult question of delimitation
could be circumvented if the law is determined based on the
objects' nature or purpose. Those performing space missions
should be governed by space law, but their traverse through
other states' airspace should be regulated.
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE THE DAWN of the Space Age, the exploration and useof outer space have been accompanied by mankind's effort
to regulate space activities through legal means. The many legal
issues relating to this new frontier have consumed a great deal
of international space lawyers' time and effort. Amongst these
issues, the delimitation between airspace and outer space is one
of the most discussed questions. The question seems so funda-
mental, as if its settlement is a precondition for the considera-
tion of all other questions relating to outer space. But over fifty-
five years into the space age, states still have not agreed on
where airspace ends and outer space begins, or whether a clear
line of demarcation is even necessary. Perhaps far beyond the
prediction of early space lawyers, this lacuna has not given rise
to any significant problems, but there has never been a lack of
concern in either the political or scholarly arenas. It does not
follow, however, that a boundary will never be needed. The de-
limitation question should be studied by considering new tech-
nological developments.
This article studies the reasons and consequences of the long-
lasting absence of a legal boundary between airspace and outer
space, and the challenge posed by the emergence of aerospace
objects. After an overview of the separate legal regimes gov-
erning space and aerial activities, Part II discusses why the ab-
sence of a boundary between airspace and outer space has not
created significant problems for the determination of law appli-
cable to traditional flight craft-aircraft and space objects. Part
I The term "aerospace object" is undefined in international legal literature
and regulations. Space law often uses the terms "spacecraft" or "space object"; air
law often uses the term "aircraft." See U.N. Secretariat, Questionnaire on Possible
Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States, 3,
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635 (Feb. 15,
1996) (German response) [hereinafter UNCOPUOS Questionnaire]. The
United Nations (U.N.) attempted to define an "aerospace object" as "an object
which is capable both of travelling through outer space and of using its aerody-
namic properties to remain in airspace for a certain period of time." Id.
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III examines whether the advent of aerospace objects necessi-
tates delimitation, how the applicable law should be deter-
mined, and how the objects' traverse through other states'
airspace should be regulated. Part IV summarizes the conclu-
sions with respect to these issues.
II. TRADITIONAL FLIGHT CRAFT AND THE FREEDOM
OF TRANSIT PASSAGE FOR SPACE OBJECTS
The space above the surface of the Earth-not only the at-
mosphere surrounding the planet but also the vast, void space
beyond-provides spacious room for flight craft. The study of
this space can be based on different physical theories. Accord-
ing to the current flight theories of aerodynamics and as-
trodynamics, flight craft are divided into two main categories:
aircraft and space objects.2 Correspondingly, space is divided
into airspace and outer space, which, under international law,
are subject to the various regimes of air law and space law,
respectively.'
A. DIFFERENT LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING AIRSPACE
AND OUTER SPACE
A firmly established principle of international law states that
the airspace above a sovereign state's territory is subject to its
full and exclusive sovereignty.4 The Convention Relating to the
Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919 (Paris Convention),
which was largely based on the Roman dictum cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad coelum ("he who owns the soil owns up to the
sky"), provides: "The High Contracting Parties recognise that
every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air-
space above its territory."5 The Convention on International
Civil Aviation of 1944 (Chicago Convention), which replaced
the Paris Convention, stipulates: "The contracting States recog-
nize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the airspace above its territory."' The rule also finds support in
the jurisprudence of the International Court ofJustice (ICJ). In
Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ asserted that "[t]he principle
2 See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAw 17-19 (1997).
3 Id.
4 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation art. 1, Oct. 13,
1919, 11 U.N.T.S. 174 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
5 Id.
6 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
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of respect for territorial sovereignty is also directly infringed by
the unauthorized overflight of a State's territory by aircraft be-
longing to or under the control of the government of another
State."7 The ICJ further noted in the Benin/Niger case that "a
boundary represents the line of separation between areas of
State sovereignty, not only on the Earth's surface but also in the
subsoil and in the superjacent column of air."' It is worth men-
tioning that "the sovereignty of a coastal State extends[ ] beyond
its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an
archipelagic State, [from] its archipelagic waters" to the territo-
rial sea and the airspace over it, as well as its bed and subsoil.'
The airspace beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea is open
to all states."o
Although the Chicago Convention distinguishes between civil
aircraft and state aircraft-which include military, customs, and
police aircraft-and, regulates only the activities of civil aircraft
in detail, it requires that military aircraft be granted special au-
thorization to fly in the airspace above another sovereign's terri-
tory." In reality, any aerial intrusion by foreign military aircraft
would be deemed an infringement upon sovereignty and could
be countered with the use of armed force. A well-known case is
the Soviet downing of a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in
1960; the U-2 was flying at an altitude of twenty kilometers over
the Soviet Union.12 Given that the aircraft was in Soviet airspace,
the United States did not protest the attack on the U-2 or the
pilot's conviction and imprisonment." In contrast, a state's right
to counter unarmed civilian aircraft serving no military purpose
with the use of armed force is doubtful. The 1983 KAL-007 inci-
dent, in which a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 deviated from its
assigned flight path into Soviet airspace and was destroyed by a
Soviet fighter jet, provoked severe criticism.14 This incident led
7 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 128 (June 27).
8 The Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), 2005 I.C.J. 90, 142 (July 12).
9 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
10 See id.
II Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 3; Paris Convention, supra note 4, art.
32.
12 Major John T. Phelps II, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and Military Aircraft in Time
of Peace, 107 MIL. L. REv. 255, 287 (1985).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 257-78.
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to the adoption of a new Article 3 bis in the Chicago Convention
forbidding the use of weapons against in-flight civilian aircraft.1 5
Despite the clarity of substance, neither the Paris Convention
nor the Chicago Convention defines its scope of application-
airspace. 6 From a geographical point of view, the Earth's atmos-
phere consists of five layers from bottom to top, in decreasing
density: troposphere, stratosphere, mesosphere, thermosphere,
and exosphere." Approximately 75% of the total atmospheric
mass gathers in the troposphere, the lowest portion of the
Earth's atmosphere, which has a depth of 7 to 20 kilometers and
reaches roughly 10,000 kilometers above the Earth's surface.' 8
However, the scope of legal airspace does not equate to geo-
graphical boundaries. The Chicago Convention defines aircraft
as "any machine which can derive support in the atmosphere
from the reactions of the air."' 9 It is widely agreed that this defi-
nition includes both instruments that are lighter than air, such
as balloons and airships, and those that are heavier than air,
such as gliders and aeroplanes.o It could thus be inferred that
the Conventions give states sovereignty only over atmospheric
space where sufficient air exists to sustain aircraft flight, an alti-
tude much lower than the outer limit of the atmosphere.2 '
While the Conventions left the legal status of the area beyond
the point of aerodynamic functionality undetermined, the status
became partially defined as the Space Age dawned. When the
Soviet Union and the United States began launching artificial
satellites, neither country sought consent from other states over
whose territory the satellites orbited. 2 Furthermore, the
launches did not elicit any accusations that a state's sovereignty
had been violated.2 1 Within a short span of time, a customary
rule emerged that Earth orbits are beyond the sovereignty of
15 See id. at 277-78; Chicago Convention, supra note 6, Annex 7.
16 See Chicago Convention, supra note 6; Paris Convention, supra note 4.
17 The Layers of the Earth's Atmosphere, NASA, http://airs.jpl.nasa.gov/maps/sat
ellite-feed/atmospherelayers (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
18 Id.
19 CHENG, supra note 2, at 18.
20 Id.
21 See generally The Layers of the Earth's Atmosphere, supra note 17 (noting that
satellites orbit in the exosphere, the International Space Station orbits in the
thermosphere, and the ozone ends with the stratosphere).
22 SeeJoseph A. Bosco, International Law Regarding Outer Space-An Overview, 55
J. AIR L. & COM. 609, 620-21 (1990); Ram Jakhu, International Law Governing the
Acquisition and Dissemination of Satellite Imagery, 29 J. SPACE L. 65, 73-74 (2003).
23 SeeJakhu, supra note 22, at 73-74.
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subjacent states and are free for exploration and use. 24 This cus-
tomary international law of the freedom of outer space was rec-
ognized by the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
adopted by the General Assembly on December 13, 1963, as Res-
olution 1962 (XVIII).2 1 It was then codified in the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), which recognizes that outer
space "shall be free for exploration and use by all states without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accor-
dance with international law."2 6 Additionally, outer space is "not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means."" Although
some equatorial states, through the Bogot Declaration of 1976,
have staked claims over the arcs of the geostationary orbit,28
their position is unilateral and unsupported by other states.
Similar to international air law, international space law does
not clearly define its sphere of application. In the general sense,
outer space refers to the known and unknown areas of the uni-
verse beyond airspace. In the legal sense, the term is defined as
the space surrounding the planet that, in accordance with the
Outer Space Treaty, is not subject to a claim of appropriation by
any national sovereignty.29 This definition does not explicitly de-
fine the scope of outer space, but it could be inferred from the
constant practice of states that the space where artificial satel-
lites orbit belongs to outer space. In other words, outer space
begins at least at the lowest perigee of artificial satellites. 30 It
does not necessarily follow, however, that the altitude is also the
upper limit of airspace.
24 See G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962 (Dec. 13, 1963).
23 Id.
26 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 1,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
27 Id. art. 2.
28 Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, Dec. 3, 1976, avail-
able at www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/library/space/InternationalAgreements/dec
larations/1976 bogota declaration.pdf.
29 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1135 (9th ed. 2009).
30 Katherine M. Gorove, Delimitation of Outer Space and the Aerospace Object-
Where Is the Law?, 28 J. SPACE L. 11, 11 (2000).
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B. THE DELIMITATION BETWEEN AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE
It seems only natural that the different legal regimes gov-
erning airspace and outer space would necessitate a clear line of
demarcation to determine the law applicable to the activities of
aircraft and space objects. However, as previously noted, existing
international law merely establishes the space where aircraft fly
as airspace, and the space where space objects orbit as outer
space. According to the predominant view, the highest altitude
at which traditional aircraft fly is approximately twenty-one kilo-
meters, while the lowest perigee for artificial satellites is ninety-
six kilometers."' The atmosphere in the intermediate zone be-
tween these two altitudes, which scientists refer to as "near
space," is too thin to sustain aircraft and too dense for space-
craft.3 2 Under the two-layer approach of delimitation, it is some-
where in this zone that the boundary between airspace and
outer space lies. As Professor Bin Cheng stated at the 1966 Hel-
sinki Conference of the International Law Association,
First, there is that layer of a State's superincumbent space clos-
est to the surface of the [E]arth which is incontrovertibly subject
to national sovereignty. There is, secondly, beyond the point
stated in the draft Resolution, the vast space which is equally in-
controvertibly not subject to national sovereignty or appropria-
tion. But . .. there is, thirdly, an intermediate zone of uncertainty
lying below the point stated in the draft Resolution and above
the undisputed zone of national airspace, in which, at a height
that is not yet clearly defined, lies the actual boundary line be-
tween national space and outer space . . . .
Nor is outer space clearly defined within the realm of domes-
tic law. States were invited by the Working Group on Matters
Relating to the Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space of
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)
to "submit information on national legislation or any national
practices that may exist or are being developed relating directly
or indirectly to the definition and/or delimitation of outer
space."34 According to the information submitted, most states
31 Id. at 12.
32 WEN-QING WANG, NEAR-SPACE REMOTE SENSING: POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES
1 (2011).
3 INT'L L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI
167 (1966).
34 The invitation was recommended in 2005 by the Working Group on Matters
Relating to the Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space at the forty-fourth
session of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
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do not have any such national legislation or practices." Austra-
lia's Space Activities Act of 1998 (the Act), which regulates the
launch from (and the return to) Australia of space objects and
the launch of space objects by Australian nationals outside of
Australia, was amended in 2002 to clarify where the Aci applies
and what activities the Act regulates.3 ' As a result, the Act ap-
plies to space activities that occur or are intended to occur
above 100 kilometers in altitude. However, Australia further
clarified that the identification of the 100-kilometer altitude in
the Act was not an attempt to define or delimit "outer space.""
Relatedly, Belarus divides its airspace into classified and unclassi-
fied airspace." Classified airspace is that below an altitude of
20,100 meters, and flights therein are governed by domestic leg-
islation: the Air Code and the Rules for the Use of Airspace.40
Airspace above 20,100 meters is considered outer space and is
regulated by international agreements.' The Belarusian legisla-
tion basically adopts the upper operative limit of aircraft as the
boundary and classifies "near space" as part of outer space.
Serbia, looking to radio frequencies as the determining factor,
defines the term "outer space" as "space at a distance of 2 mil-
lion [kilometers] or more from the Earth."43 This criterion is
unlikely to become generally accepted because artificial satel-
Outer Space. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm.,
Rep. on its 44th Sess., Apr. 4-15, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/850, Annex I (Apr.
28, 2005). The recommendation of the Working Group was approved by the Sub-
committee during its forty-fourth session and endorsed by the Committee at its
forty-eighth session. See Rep. of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
48th Sess., June 8-17, 2005, 1 203, U.N. Doc. A/60/20; GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp.
No. 20 (2005).
3 See Rep. of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 49th Sess., June
7-16, 2006, 11 201-10, U.N. Doc. A/61/20; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 20
(2006).
36 U.N. Secretariat, National Legislation and Practice Relating to Definition
and Delimitation of Outer Space, 1 1-2, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/865/Add.1 (Mar. 20, 2006).
37 Id. 2.
38 Id.
3 U.N. Secretariat, National Legislation and Practice Relating to Definition
and Delimitation of Outer Space, 1 3, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer




43 U.N. Secretariat, National Legislation and Practice Relating to the Defini-
tion and Delimitation of Outer Space, 1, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/865/Add.6 (Jan. 11, 2010).
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lites orbit much lower than two million kilometers, and state
practice has established that the space where they orbit belongs
to outer space.44
In fact, there is a clear disagreement in both political and
scholarly circles regarding the necessity of delimitation between
airspace and outer space. Those who advocate a physical
boundary are referred to as "spatialists."4 6 Proponents of this ap-
proach have suggested various lines based on different stan-
dards," further dividing themselves into a number of
subgroups. However, out of the variety of proposals, no consen-
sus has been achieved.4 8 In contrast to spatialists, the group of
"functionalists," led by Professors Myers S. McDougal, Harold D.
Lasswell, and Ivan A. Vlasic, argue that drawing a physical line
would be premature and arbitrary, and that the applicable law
should be determined by the nature and purpose of activities. 9
This approach is particularly attractive to space powers that are
reluctant to have their hands constrained by a fixed physical
line. With the question of delimitation remaining unresolved,
the functionalist approach has been predominant in the last few
decades because it is sufficient for determining the law applica-
ble to traditional flight craft.50 This is largely because the
spheres of aerial and space activities do not overlap. As previ-
ously stated, the highest altitude of traditional aircraft flight is
approximately twenty-one kilometers, while the lowest perigee
of artificial satellites is ninety-six kilometers.5 ' The intermediate
"near space" has been called "no-man's land."5 2 One would have
little difficulty applying air law to aerial activities and space law
to space activities. Perhaps this is the reason why the long-lasting
lack of a clear legal boundary between airspace and outer space
has not created any significant problems thus far.
44 See Katherine M. Gorove, supra note 30, at 11-12.
45 Id. at 11.
46 Id. at 16.
47 See id.
48 Id. at 17.
49 Id. at 16.
50 Id. at 17.
51 Id. at 12.
52 Id.
2013] DELIMITATION 363
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
C. THE RIGHT OF TRANSIT PASSAGE THROUGH
THIRD-STATE AIRSPACE
Although the spheres of aerial and space activities do not
overlap, in some cases space objects need to traverse the air-
space of other states to reach outer space or return to Earth.
There have been discussions as to whether such space objects
enjoy the right of transit through third-state airspace at the
stages of ascent and descent.53 Among proponents of the right is
Judge Manfred Lachs, who believes that some unwritten rule of
law concerning transit through airspace to reach outer space
has come into being.5 4 In reality, most space objects are
launched into outer space through the launching state's own
airspace, and sometimes through the open airspace above the
high seas.5 ' But in some instances, states cross a neighboring
state's airspace without seeking prior consent.56
Wei Zhou, an experienced Chinese practitioner in interna-
tional commercial satellite launching services, wrote that as a
customary rule, the launching state need not seek prior consent
from neighboring states for the overflight of its launching vehi-
cles. Some other proponents of the right draw an inference
from the purpose of the Outer Space Treaty." As written by Pro-
fessor Stephen Gorove, "the freedom of exploration and use of
outer space ... implies the freedom to go into outer space and
also the freedom to return to Earth from outer space."5
The right of transit is vital for launching states, particularly
those with the inherent disadvantage of small territorial size, be-
cause without the right, the freedom of space exploration and
use would be meaningless. But the right of transit is not com-
plete-transit states have the legitimate concern that complete
freedom of transit would compromise their full and exclusive
sovereignty over their airspace. Their legitimate interest should
be respected. This resembles the right of access to and from the
5 HENRI A. WASSENBERGH, PRINCIPLES OF OUTER SPACE LAW IN HINDSIGHT 36
(1991).
5 MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPO-
RARY LAW-MAKING 60 (1972).
55 Katherine M. Gorove, supra note 30, at 13.
56 See Dean N. Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J. AIR L. &
Com. 65, 101-04 (2007).
57 Wei Zhou, International Space Law and China's Policy and Regulations on Inter-
national Commercial Satellite Launching Service, AEROSPACE CHINA, 2004, at 10, 11.
58 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 26.




sea and freedom of transit for landlocked states in the Law of
the Sea."o In this regard, the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides:
1. Land-locked States shall have the right of access to and from
the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for
in this Convention[,] including those relating to the free-
dom of the high seas and the common heritage of mankind.
To this end, land-locked States shall enjoy freedom of transit
through the territory of transit States by all means of
transport.
2. The terms and modalities for exercising freedom of transit
shall be agreed between the land-locked States and transit
States concerned through bilateral, subregional[,] or re-
gional agreements.
3. Transit States, in the exercise of their full sovereignty over
their territory, shall have the right to take all measures neces-
sary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for in
this Part for land-locked States shall in no way infringe their
legitimate interests."
The UNCLOS provides a useful reference for reconciliation
between the right of transit to and from outer space for "space-
locked" states and the requirement that the sovereignty of
transit states be respected.6 2 The guiding principle is that each
side should pay due regard to the rights and duties of the
other. 3 On the one hand, states shall have the right of access to
and from outer space for the purpose of exercising rights pro-
vided by the Outer Space Treaty, including the freedom of
space exploration and use. To this end, states' spacecraft shall
enjoy freedom of transit through the airspace of transit states.
Transit states, on the other hand, shall have the right to take all
measures necessary to ensure that launching states' transit activi-
ties do not infringe on their legitimate interests, such as na-
tional security and air traffic control.65 Specific terms need to be
set out in international agreements." Due to the rarity of such
occasions, such agreements would most likely be concluded on a
bilateral basis.
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III. AEROSPACE OBJECTS AND THE RIGHT
OF INNOCENT PASSAGE
The question of legal delimitation between airspace and outer
space must be studied with due regard for new trends of techno-
logical development in flight craft that might necessitate delimi-
tation or the adjustment of existing international law. One
example is aerospace objects, which combine the functional
characteristics of aircraft and space objects and are capable of
flying in both airspace and outer space.
Aerospace objects have been or are being planned,
researched, and tested in the public and private sectors and at
the multinational level. Suborbital spacecraft are an example. In
the 1960s, the United States conducted a series of tests of its X-
15 rocket research aircraft, a type of suborbital winged space-
craft."7 The X-15 was launched from the air, 8 and because of its
wings, it could land and be reused." It also had a rocket engine
that enabled it to operate outside the presence of significant at-
mosphere. 0 It is worth noting that the maximum altitude
reached by the X-15 varied from 18.73 miles to 67.08 miles.
The U.S. Air Force awarded astronaut wings to X-15 pilots who
flew above an altitude of 50 miles, while the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA) required its pilots to fly
above 62 miles (100 kilometers) before considering them astro-
nauts.7 2 Other examples of suborbital spaceplanes are the
SpaceShipOne (Scaled Composities of Mojave, California), the
Bristol Spaceplanes Ascender (Bristol Spaceplanes), and the Xe-
rus spaceplane (XCOR Aerospace).7 3 Unlike the X-15, some
other aerospace objects are launched by ballistic technologies. 4
Examples include the Dyna-Soar (United States, 1957-1963),
Hermes (European Space Agency, 1987-1993), HOPE (Japan,
1992-2003), and Kliper (Russia, 2004-present)." To increase
lift, the development of the spaceplane has also led to the piggy-
back concept, whereby a winged orbiter is mounted to the side
67 MATTHEw A. BENTLEY, SPACEPLANES: FROM AIRPORT TO SPACEPORT 72-79
(2009).
68 Id. at 78.
69 Id. at 72.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 76.
72 Id. at 72.
73 Id. at 80.
74 See id. at 86-89.
75 Id.
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or astride the back of a booster stage.7' The two components
take off together and reach as high an altitude and as fast a
speed as possible using the booster's engines. The orbiter then
separates, ignites its own rocket engines, and continues to accel-
erate to orbital velocity. An example is NASA's Space Shuttle,
which was used on a total of 135 missions from 1981 to 2011.79
The Soviet Union's version of the Space Shuttle, the Buran, flew
only once, on November 15, 1988.80 More recently, Bristol
Spaceplanes and others have developed much more ambitious
plans to take passengers to orbit by Spacecab and Spacebus,
which are also based on the piggyback concept."
In a typical complete flight, an aerospace object takes off or is
launched from the Earth's surface, traverses airspace, reaches
into outer space, and then reenters airspace before touching
down on Earth. During this process, an aerospace object crosses
the boundary between airspace and outer space at least twice.
One of the foremost legal issues arising from the advent of aero-
space objects is the applicable law and, more broadly, its impact
upon the delimitation between airspace and outer space.
A. THE LAW APPLICABLE TO AEROSPACE OBJECTS
The development of ae'rospace objects prompted the
COPUOS to invite its state members, by a note verbale of the
Secretary-General dated August 21, 1995, to give their opinions
on various legal issues that may arise from this new development
through the Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard
to Aerospace Objects. The replies were to provide the Legal
Subcommittee with a basis for deciding how it might continue
its consideration of matters relating to the definition and delimi-
tation of outer space.83 With respect to the law applicable to
aerospace objects, states following the spatialist approach held
that an aerospace object is an aircraft subject to air law in air-
space and a space object subject to space law in outer space."
76 Id. at 93.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Space Shuttle Era, NASA (May 10, 2013), http://www.nasa.gov/mission_
pages/shuttle/flyout.
80 BENTLEY, supra note 67, at 100-01.
81 Id. at 101-03.
82 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire, supra note 1, at 2.
83 See id.
84 See, e.g., id. (regarding the responses of Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, El Salva-
dor, Fiji, Finland, Republic of Korea, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Peru, Phillipines, Rwanda,
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Those following the functional approach, on the other hand,
asserted that the legal regime applicable to the flight of aero-
space objects is decided by the purpose or function of the activ-
ity, rather than by the location." In other words, if the
aerospace object is used for Earth-to-space transportation, it
would be subject to the law of outer space; if it is used for Earth-
to-Earth transportation, it would be subject to air law. The two
approaches divide the responding state members of the
COPUOS into two camps of more or less equal number.
However, many functionalists acknowledge that aerospace ob-
jects must observe some principles and rules of the spatialist le-
gal regime if they move through another state's airspace. For
instance, some functionalist states, such as the Czech Republic,
Germany, and Mexico, maintain that the application of space
law to aerospace objects does not exclude the application of cer-
tain provisions of air law, in particular those relating to authori-
zation of passage and air traffic, when aerospace objects move
through another state's airspace." A few states mentioned the
possibility of establishing a sui generis regime." As argued by Ar-
gentina and Turkey, the special characteristics of aerospace ob-
jects and future technological developments in this field may
necessitate the establishment of a special regime that accounts
for situations not provided for under current international air
and space law. 8
As previously mentioned, the area below the twenty-one-kilo-
meter line is definitely airspace of the subjacent state and the
area above the ninety-six-kilometer line is definitely outer space,
while the legal status of the zone in between remains ambigu-
Syrian Arab Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and
Belarus, memorialized in addendums one through sixteen).
85 See, e.g., id. (regarding the responses of Benin, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Germany, India, Italy, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Russian Federation, Slovakia,
South Mrica, Ukraine, Nigeria, and Egypt, memorialized in addendums one
through sixteen).
86 Id. at 6-10; U.N. Secretariat, Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with
Regard to Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States, 8-11, Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635/Add.7 (Jan. 13, 2003)
[hereinafter UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.7].
87 See Rep. of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 48th Sess., supra
note 34, 1 205.
88 U.N. Secretariat, Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to
Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States, 4, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635/Add.4 (Apr. 1, 1997) [hereinafter UN-
COPUOS Questionnaire Add.4]; UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.7, supra note
86, at 8.
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ous. To have a clear demarcation between airspace and outer
space would bring more certainty. But as one moves away from
the Earth, there is a continuum of ever-diminishing atmospheric
thickness, and any line of delimitation seems arbitrary. Unsur-
prisingly, no agreement has been reached on this question in
the COPUOS over the past few decades.89 The advent of aero-
space objects does not make the delimitation process easier.
Rather, the difficult question could continue to be shelved and
circumvented if the functionalist approach is adopted.o As pre-
viously discussed, under the functionalist approach, aerospace
objects performing Earth-to-space transportation are likened to
space objects and governed by space law, while aerospace ob-
jects performing Earth-to-Earth transportation are governed by
air law even though they may temporarily traverse outer space.
B. THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH
THIRD-STATE AIRSPACE
The primary hurdle toward applying the functionalist ap-
proach to aerospace objects is the right of passage through the
airspace of third states. Like traditional space objects, aerospace
objects, even if performing the function of Earth-to-space trans-
portation, may have to traverse the airspace of third states."
This raises the question of whether aerospace objects enjoy the
right of free passage during the stages of ascent and descent.
State members of the COPUOS were invited to submit prece-
dents with respect to the passage of aerospace objects during
takeoff and reentry into Earth's atmosphere. Germany and
89 Dr. Vernon Nase, Delimitation and the Suborbital Passenger: Time to End
Prevawfication, 77J. AIR L. & COM. 747, 752 (2012).
90 Id.
91 Katherine M. Gorove, supra note 30, at 13-14.
92 At its thirty-eighth session, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space noted:
[A] t the thirty-fourth session of the Legal Subcommittee, the Work-
ing Group of the Subcommittee on an agenda item on "Matters
relating to the definition and delimitation of outer space and to the
character and utilization of the geostationary orbit" had finalized
the text of a questionnaire on possible legal issues with regard to
aerospace objects. The Committee agreed with the Legal Subcom-
mittee ([UN Doc.] A/AC.105/607 and Corr.1, para. 38) that the
purpose of the questionnaire was to seek the preliminary views of
States members of the Committee on various issues relating to aero-
space objects. The Committee also agreed that the replies to the
questionnaire could provide a basis for the Legal Subcommittee to
decide how it might continue its consideration of this agenda item.
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Morocco mentioned that in 1988, the Buran of the former So-
viet Union overflew foreign countries before touching down in
Baikonur. 3 However, no information associated with consulta-
tions on the mission was available.9 4 Kazakhstan noted the exis-
tence of at least one precedent in which space objects of the
Russian Federation passed through its airspace.9 5 It also clarified
that " [s] uch passage was provided for under the Agreement be-
tween the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan of
28 March 1994 on the Main Principles and Conditions for Utili-
zation of the Baikonur Launch Site."96 The conclusion of the
agreement is arguably proof that the right of innocent passage
does not exist ipso facto, but rather must be recognized sui
generis. Russia confirmed that in March 1990, the United States
communicated information to the USSR regarding the final
flight stage of the Atlantis space shuttle just a few hours before
the overflight took place.97 However, an agreement was reached
that such furnishings of information should not be deemed to
At its forty-first session, the Legal Subcommittee endorsed the re-
port of the Working Group on agenda item 6 (a), "Matters relating
to the definition and delimitation of outer space." The working
group revised the questionnaire on possible legal issues with regard
to aerospace objects and agreed to amend questions 7 and 8 and to
add a question 10. The Working Group agreed that the question-
naire, as amended, should be circulated to all Member States of the
United Nations ([UN Doc.] A/AC.105/787, annex II, paras. 8, 10
and 11).
Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace Objects: Replies from Mem-
ber States, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRs, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/
oosa/en/SpaceLaw/aero/index.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2013).
93 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire, supra note 1, at 30; U.N. Secretariat, Question-
naire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace Objects: Replies from
Member States, 17, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/635/Add.6 (Jan. 21, 2002).
94 In their responses, the Netherlands likened the Buran to the U.S. Space
Shuttle and distinguished the two from aerospace objects that possess autono-
mous maneuverability. UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.4, supra note 88. How-
ever, this article categorizes both the Buran and the U.S. Space Shuttle as a kind
of aerospace object.
95 U.N. Secretariat, Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to
Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States, 7, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635/Add.3 (Dec. 4, 1996) [hereinafter
UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.3].
96 Id.
97 U.N. Secretariat, Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to
Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States, 6, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 1996) [hereinafter
UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.I].
set a precedent." A few states also mentioned the incidents of
Apollo 13, SNAP 27, COSMOS-954, Mir, Skylab, and COSMOS-
1402.99
As a matter of fact, so far, very few precedents exist with re-
spect to the passage of aerospace objects through the airspace of
third states.100 Aerospace objects can be designed to take off
from one's own territory, reenter the Earth's atmosphere over
the high seas, and touch down on one's own territory so that
flight over foreign countries is not necessary.10 1 Many of the
above instances pertain to traditional space objects rather than
aerospace objects.10 2 As Finland correctly noted, "[tihe fall of
Cosmos 954, the re-entry of Skylab, the Shuttle disintegrations,
the splash-down of Mir[,] and other related incidents pertain to
the passage of 'space objects' upon re-entry into the Earth's at-
mosphere" rather than to "aerospace vehicles" in the strict
sense.1 0 3 The unintentional reentry of space objects and their
fragments is governed by current space law, in particular the
Outer Space Treaty, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astro-
nauts, and the Liability Convention.1 0 4
COPUOS states hold different views regarding the existence
of customary law permitting the innocent passage of aerospace
objects through the airspace of third states.' 5 Due to the scar-
city of state practice, many responding states held that there is
insufficient support for the conclusion that the right of passage
for an ascending or descending aerospace object has been gen-
erally recognized as a customary rule of international law.10' On
the other hand, several states supported the existence of the
right. 0 7 For instance, based on the lack of objection or opposi-
tion to the passage of U.S. Space Shuttles through third-state
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., UNCOPUOS Questionnaire, supra note 1, at 11.
100 Katherine M. Gorove, supra note 30, at 13.
101 See id. at 12-13.
102 See id.
103 U.N. Secretariat, Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to
Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States, 10, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635/Add.11 (Jan. 26, 2005) [hereinafter
UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.11].
104 U.N. Secretariat, Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to
Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States, 11, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635/Add.10 (Jan. 21, 2004) [hereinafter
UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.10].
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airspace, Greece, Slovakia, and Benin contended that an inter-
national customary law-right to innocent passage-had been
created. 0 8 Chile also submitted that customary law exists with
respect to aerospace objects, on the basis that "they are re-
garded as craft performing a space mission to which the norms
of air law do not apply."'09 The fact that, in practice, invasive
passage occurs without protest is widely recognized, even by
states skeptical of the existence of the right, such as the Czech
Republic.no India and Peru also noted that no state has sought
to exercise jurisdiction over spacecraft of another state during
invasive passage."' However, the lack of protest does not always
equate to approval.112 As the Republic of Korea pointed out,
[t]he fact that most of the countries did not raise any objection
to the passage of space objects over their airspace does not sig-
nify their approval of the passage as international practice or
precedents; they just did not have any information about the pas-
sage and there was no special perceptible disadvantage [con-
nected] with the passage at that time."13
If the functionalist approach is taken, wherein aerospace ob-
jects with Earth-to-space purposes are likened to traditional
space objects, they should reasonably enjoy the freedom of
transit through the airspace of third states. But the predominant
attitude of states seems to point in the other direction." 4 State
members of COPUOS have been asked whether the norms of
national and international air law are applicable to an aerospace
object of one state while it is in the airspace of another state."15
108 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.3, supra note 95, at 7; UNCOPUOS Ques-
tionnaire Add.10, supra note 104, at 10; U.N. Secretariat, Questionnaire on Possi-
ble Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States,
6, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635/Add.9
(May 7, 2003) [hereinafter UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.9].
109 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.3, supra note 95, at 7.
110 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire, supra note 1, at 10.
1I1 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.4, supra note 88, at 7; UNCOPUOS Ques-
tionnaire Add.9, supra note 108, at 6.
112 See UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.1, supra note 97, at 6.
113 Id.
114 See generally U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, COMPILATION OF REPLIES
RECEIVED FROM MEMBER STATES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON POSSIBLE LEGAL ISSUES
WITH REGARD TO AEROSPACE OBJECTS, available at wwNv.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/
en/SpaceLaw/aero/index.html [hereinafter QUESTIONNAIRE REPLIES COMPILA-
TION].
115 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire, supra note 1, at 10.
372 [ 78
DELIMITATION
Most responding states answered in the affirmative.1 1 6 Among
them are many proponents of the functionalist approach.1 17 Ae-
rial safety is the primary concern for those states.11 8 But the Re-
public of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic noted that
national security is also a concern."' In contrast, only a few
states adhered to the functionalist approach in determining the
law applicable to aerospace objects traveling through the air-
space of other states.120 They determined that when the final
destination of an aerospace object is outer space, its movement
through airspace is simply an obligatory passage, similar to the
innocent passage of a space object through the airspace of a
foreign state.' 2 1 Therefore, aerospace objects serving the pur-
pose of astronautics should have the right of innocent passage
through the airspace of third states, although the launching
state must pay due regard to the complete and exclusive sover-
eignty of the third state and its national security interests by ob-
serving the norms of air law regarding safe navigation and
environmental protection. 1 22
In summary, there is disagreement among states as to whether
aerospace objects enjoy the right of innocent passage through
the airspace of third states, and it seems highly unlikely that
states will tolerate free passage of foreign aerospace objects
through their airspace. As research in aerospace objects is con-
ducted by an increasing number of countries, particularly those
with less favorable geographical positions, overflights through
third-state airspace are more likely to occur. It is likely that un-
authorized overflights will provoke objections from subjacent
states. To cope with the new development and avoid conflict,
the passage of aerospace objects through third-state airspace
must be regulated in a way that reconciles the legitimate right of
116 See, e.g., QUESTIONNAIRE REPLIES COMPILATION, supra note 114 (regarding
responses of Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Phil-
ippines, Rwanda, Slovakia, Syrian Arab Republic, the Netherlands, Turkey, Lib-
yan Arab jamahiriya, Nigeria, Spain, and Belarus).
117 See id.
118 See, e.g., UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.11, supra note 103, at 9 (Finnish
response).
119 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.1, supra note 97, at 5; UNCOPUOS Ques-
tionnaire Add.3, supra note 95, at 6.
120 See QUESTIONNAIRE REPLIES COMPILATION, supra note 114 (regarding re-
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transit states to ensure aerial safety and protect national security,
and the right of user states to conduct aerospace missions.
C. THE RECONCILIATION
To determine whether an aerospace object will traverse the
airspace of other states, it is important to know the object's typi-
cal trajectory. In this context, the German response to the 1996
COPUOS Questionnaire provides a valuable reference.'" The
German submission included a trajectory chart reflecting reen-
try data gathered from the flight of the U.S. Space Shuttle.12
This trajectory data would similarly apply to other space trans-
portation systems.' 2 5 As demonstrated by the chart, while an
aerospace object is usually only dozens of kilometers away from
the landing strip as it descends from an altitude of 21 kilome-
ters, it would be over 7,000 kilometers away at an altitude of 96
kilometers.' 2 Therefore, aerospace objects are much more
likely to overfly other states through the ambiguous 21-to-96-kil-
ometer zone than through the undisputed 21-kilometer zone.
The traverse of aerospace objects through the 21-kilometer
zone of other states, albeit rare, needs to be regulated due to
considerations such as the intrinsic value of sovereignty, na-
tional security, aerial safety, and safety on the ground. Such reg-
ulation would both contribute to the avoidance of possible
conflicts between user states and transit states, and dilute the
urgency of delimitation. If the transit right of aerospace objects
performing Earth-to-space transportation is recognized and reg-
ulated within the 21-kilometer zone that is undisputedly air-
space, aerospace objects should also enjoy an equivalent, if not
greater, right in the 21-to-96-kilometer zone. In reality, states are
more tolerant of aerospace objects traversing through the latter
portion of atmosphere above them. As observed by historian
James Oberg, the U.S. Space Shuttle has flown over Canada be-
low 80 kilometers without asking permission. 12 7 There are sev-
eral likely reasons for this tolerance. First, it is not prudent to
claim sovereignty over this atmospheric zone given its ambigu-
ous legal status. Second, the traverse of aerospace objects does
not lead to interference in the zone because human activities
123 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire, supra note 1, at 3-6.
124 Id. at 4-5.
125 Id. at 3-6.
126 See id.
127 SeeJAMES OBERG, SPACE POWER THEORY 80 (1999).
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therein remain scarce. Third, aerospace objects are used merely
for the purpose of transportation and do not impose a signifi-
cantly perceptible disadvantage upon the subjacent state. There-
fore, the advent of aerospace objects does not bring compelling
incentives for delimitation. But it will be a completely different
matter when new flight craft are made to remain stationary and
conduct certain activities in the 21-to-96-kilometer zone above
other states. The so-called near-space vehicles (NSVs) undergo-
ing testing in some countries may be capable of such activity.' 2
When such a situation arises, some states may object to the oper-
ation of other states' NSVs in the 21-to-96-kilometer zone above
them, and some may even extend their claim of vertical sover-
eignty. Thus, the delimitation issue will become a vital one.
Reconciliation of the right of passage with the principle of
sovereignty is not impossible, as is demonstrated by the right of
innocent passage through territorial waters.' 29 Proposals have
been made for the codification, in treaty form, of norms for the
peaceful passage of aerospace objects through the airspace of
other states when they return from orbit. Chile-while holding
that aerospace objects traveling through Chilean airspace will be
subject to Chilean air regulations (particularly those related to
air safety) -conceded that air law should provide for special, ap-
propriate norms for cases where passage is obligatory and the
sole objective is to reach outer space.' Portugal suggested that
in determining those norms, reference could be made to the
model provided by the law applicable to innocent passage
through territorial waters.' 3 '
As previously noted, in reality, states are more cautious when
aerial matters are concerned. In fact, the right of innocent pas-
sage does not exist for aircraft at the customary international law
level. Under conventional law, the International Air Services
Transit Agreement of 1944, signed by 129 parties, allows aircraft
engaged in scheduled air services to travel through the airspace
of the respective parties.3 2 Article 5 of the Chicago Convention
128 See William B. Scott, The Fringe of Space; Novel Hybrid Near-Space Platform
Awaits a Visionary Financial Angel, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 30, 2006, at
60.
1"9 See UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 397.
130 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.10, supra note 104, at 5.
131 UNCOPUOS Questionnaire Add.11, supra note 103, at 5.
132 International Air Service Transit Agreement art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, ICAO Doc.
7500, 59 Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
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gives a transit right only for nonscheduled operations.' These
agreements are applicable only to their state parties. Therefore,
the passage of aerospace objects through third-state airspace
should be subject to stricter regulations than space objects. Spe-
cific rules of transit need to be negotiated between states, taking
full account of the aerial safety and national security of the
transit state. Reference could be made to the right of innocent
passage in the law of the sea. UNCLOS provides that "ships of all
States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of inno-
cent passage through the territorial sea,"l3 4 and that "[p]assage
is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State."' 3 ' Examples of non-inno-
cent passage include:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in
any other manner in violation of the principles of interna-
tional law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of
the defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or
security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military
device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or
person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sani-
tary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wil[1]ful and serious pollution contrary to this
Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communica-
tion or any other facilities or installations of the coastal
State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.'"'
By analogy, there are rules that should be complied with by
states whose aerospace objects traverse third-state airspace. First,
aerospace objects' transit routes should be projected in a way
that infringes upon other states' sovereignty as little as possible.
133 Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 5.
134 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 17.
135 Id. art. 19, 1 1.
136 Id. art. 19, 1 2.
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For instance, coastal states should use the open airspace above
the high seas to the greatest extent feasible. Second, the state
through which the object may travel should be consulted in ad-
vance. Third, the transit should be incidental to the passage into
or from outer space unless rendered necessary by force majeure
or distress. Other activities without a direct bearing on passage,
such as research and survey activities, should be strictly prohib-
ited. In this regard, a useful reference could be made to the
distinction between movement rights and operational rights in
the law of the sea.' 3 7 According to Professor Petros Liacouras,
the "category of movement rights relates to mobility and in-
cludes navigation on the high seas outside the limit of the terri-
torial sea, innocent passage through the territorial sea [,] and
transit passage through straits used for international naviga-
tion," while the category of operational rights includes, "apart
from resource-oriented activities, intelligence gathering, mili-
tary exercises and maneuvers, testing of military weapons, as well
as scientific research."'3 ' Fourth, foreign aerospace objects exer-
cising the right of transit through foreign airspace shall comply
with laws and regulations of the transit states with respect to ae-
rial safety, regulation of aerial traffic, and the preservation of
the environment. The transit state may require foreign aero-
space objects exercising the right of transit through its airspace
to use such air lanes as it may designate for the passage of aero-
space objects.
IV. CONCLUSION
The unresolved state of the boundary between airspace and
outer space can be attributed to both technical difficulty and
political reluctance. Drawing a line based on any of the existing
criteria at this stage would appear arbitrary. As states' interest in
having a clear demarcation is not yet manifest, many countries
have adopted a "wait and see" attitude. The lack of a boundary
has not given rise to any significant problems so far, largely be-
cause of the noncontiguous nature of space and aerial activities.
In the few cases where space objects must traverse third-state air-
space to reach and return from outer space, bilateral or regional
137 See generally Charles E. Pirtle, Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Law of the
Sea in the Millennium, 31 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 7 (2000).
13 Petros Liacouras, Intelligence Gathering on the High Seas, in UNRESOLVED IS-
SUES AND NEW CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF THE SEA: TIME BEFORE AND TIME AFTER
123 (Anastasia Strati, Maria Gavouneli & Nikolas Skourtos eds., 2006).
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agreements are needed to establish a balance between the free-
dom of space exploration and use, and the full and complete
sovereignty of states over their airspace.
Technical innovations targeted at new flight craft may necessi-
tate delimitation or, alternatively, require the flexible adjust-
ment of international law. The emergence of aerospace objects,
which combine the functional characteristics of aircraft and
space objects, poses a challenge to, but does not seem to justify,
the urgency of delimitation. Rather, the difficult question could
be resolved by a unitary law wherein aerospace objects are gov-
erned based on their nature or purpose. Space law would be
applicable to those objects that perform Earth-to-space transpor-
tation, but they should also be required to respect air traffic
rules when transiting airspace. Due to their partial aerial nature,
aerospace objects should be subject to stricter regulations than
space objects when traversing through other states' twenty-one-
kilometer airspace.
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